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ABSTRACT 
Two Essays on the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  (August 2008) 
Roy Clemons, B.S., West Virginia University; 
M.A.S., West Virginia University; 
M.S., West Virginia University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael R. Kinney 
 This dissertation contains two essays.  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
was intended to stimulate the economy by expediting the repatriation of foreign earnings 
and requiring that those repatriations be invested in domestic operations.  The first essay 
investigates (1) who repatriated foreign earnings under the provisions of the Act, (2) 
why firms repatriated and (3) what the firms did with the repatriated funds.  The first 
essay identifies 364 firms that repatriated approximately $283 billion under the Act.  The 
only significant increase in expenditures for the repatriating firms was for stock 
repurchases, an expenditure specifically prohibited under the Act.  Firms appear to have 
repatriated foreign earnings to take advantage of the tax savings without achieving the 
Act‟s intended objective of increasing domestic investment.    
The second essay builds on recent research that evaluates the lock-out effect of 
the U.S. international tax system.  The second essay studies the factors associated with 
the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Recent evidence suggests that 
firms that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations will 
accumulate foreign earnings abroad in financial assets to avoid recording the associated 
U.S. tax liability.  However, prior research has not disentangled the difference between 
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firms that permanently reinvest their foreign earnings for reinvest into operations versus 
firms that classify their foreign earnings as permanently reinvest to indefinitely defer the 
recognition of the associated U.S. tax liability.  Using a hand-collected sample of firms 
that repatriated under the one-time tax holiday, I find that the firms were classifying their 
foreign earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. 
liability before and after the one-time tax holiday.  Also, during the tax holiday firms 
brought back significant amounts of cash previously classified as permanently reinvested 
foreign earnings suggesting that the earnings were not retained abroad for foreign 
reinvestment.  The results of essay two are consistent with theoretical predictions that 
firms repatriating under the Act classified their foreign earnings as permanently 
reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. tax liability.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION
1
 
 
This dissertation contains two essays.  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
was intended to stimulate the economy by expediting the repatriation of foreign earnings 
and requiring that those repatriations be invested in domestic operations.  The first essay 
investigates (1) who repatriated foreign earnings under the provisions of the Act, (2) why 
firms repatriated and (3) what the firms did with the repatriated funds.  The first essay 
identifies 364 firms that repatriated approximately $283 billion under the Act.  The only 
significant increase in expenditures for the repatriating firms was for stock repurchases, 
an expenditure specifically prohibited under the Act.  Firms appear to have repatriated 
foreign earnings to take advantage of the tax savings without achieving the Act‟s 
intended objective of increasing domestic investment.  Firms‟ failure to use the 
repatriated cash to increase domestic reinvestment appears to be associated with two 
circumstances: (1) the firms lacked domestic growth opportunities and (2) they could 
comply with the domestic investment requirements of AJCA without actually increasing 
investments in domestic operations.   
The second essay builds on recent research that evaluates the lock-out effect of 
the U.S. international tax system.  The second essay studies the factors associated with 
the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Recent evidence suggests that 
firms that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations will 
accumulate foreign earnings abroad in financial assets to avoid recording the associated 
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U.S. tax liability.  However, prior research has not disentangled the difference between 
firms that permanently reinvest their foreign earnings for reinvest into operations versus 
firms that classify their foreign earnings as permanently reinvest to indefinitely defer the 
recognition of the associated U.S. tax liability.  The one-time tax holiday for repatriations 
provided the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provides an interesting opportunity in 
which to evaluate the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Using a hand-
collected sample of firms that repatriated under the one-time tax holiday, I find that the 
firms were classifying their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid 
recognizing the associated U.S. liability before and after the one-time tax holiday.  Also, 
during the tax holiday firms brought back significant amounts of cash previously 
classified as permanently reinvested foreign earnings suggesting that the earnings were 
not retained abroad for foreign reinvestment.  The results of essay two are consistent with 
theoretical predictions that firms repatriating under the Act classified their foreign 
earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. tax liability.  
Collectively, my results from essay two suggest that firms held significant amounts of 
foreign earnings abroad in cash due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system and repeated the behavior immediately following the one-year tax holiday 
provided by the Act.       
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE WHO, WHY AND WHAT OF THE ONE-TIME TAX HOLIDAY FOR 
REPATRIATIONS PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 
2004 
Introduction 
The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA, the Act) of 2004 provided a one-time 
tax holiday that reduced the maximum effective U.S. tax rate on repatriated foreign 
profits from 35 percent to 5.25 percent.    Congress‟ intent in passing the Act was to 
stimulate the U.S. economy by (1) expediting the repatriation of foreign earnings that 
may have otherwise remained abroad and (2) requiring that the repatriations be invested 
in domestic operations.   
To induce firms to use the repatriated foreign earnings for domestic investment, 
firms received the one-time tax benefit only if the repatriated funds were invested in the 
U.S. pursuant to a domestic reinvestment plan approved by management prior to 
repatriation (U.S. Treasury Department 2005).  Permitted uses included domestic 
investment in research and development, capital investments, debt repayment and 
mergers and acquisitions.  Uses that were explicitly prohibited under the Act include 
distributions to shareholders and repurchase of shares.  Although the Act explicitly 
prohibited these uses, the Act lacked regulations to enforce the proscriptions.  For 
example, there was no requirement that firms isolate funds or demonstrate that spending 
on qualified uses exceeded the amount the firm would normally have spent.   Therefore, 
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the lack of regulatory constraints in implementing the Act likely permitted firms to spend 
the repatriated funds on disallowed uses. 
In this paper I investigate (1) who repatriated foreign earnings under the 
provisions of the Act, (2) why firms repatriated, and (3) what firms did with the 
repatriated funds.  I identify 364 firms that repatriated approximately $283 billion of 
earnings under the Act.  Compared to non-repatriating U.S. firms, the repatriating firms, 
on average, are larger, have more profitable foreign operations, have a higher marginal 
U.S. tax rate, a lower effective foreign tax rate, and have lower historical growth rates.  
These attributes suggest that firms repatriating under provisions of AJCA are more 
mature firms that appear to utilize foreign operations as a method of tax planning.  
Among the repatriating firms, the size-scaled amount repatriated is positively 
associated with the difference between the firms‟ U.S. marginal tax rate and effective 
foreign tax rate as well as the profitability of foreign operations.  These associations 
suggest that repatriating firms may have been accumulating their foreign earnings to 
avoid paying U.S. tax that would be due upon repatriation.  No associations were found 
between various firm growth proxies and the amount repatriated, nor the cash balance 
and the amount repatriated.  The lack of association between these variables suggests that 
the cash repatriated under the provisions of the Act was not needed to fund domestic 
growth opportunities nor was it being retained to fund domestic future growth.   
Firms were permitted under AJCA to use the repatriated cash to fund domestic 
operations, but were not permitted to distribute the cash to shareholders.  The only 
statistically significant increase in expenditures for the firms repatriating under the Act 
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was for stock repurchases, an expenditure prohibited under the Act.  The significant 
increase in stock repurchases suggests that at least some portion of the repatriations were 
indirectly funneled to prohibited expenditures. On average, firms appear to have 
responded to the opportunity to reap the tax savings provided by the Act, but did not use 
the funds to increase domestic investment.  Firms‟ failure to use the repatriated cash to 
increase domestic reinvestment appears to be associated with two circumstances: (1) the 
firms lacked domestic growth opportunities and (2) they could comply with the domestic 
investment requirements of AJCA without actually increasing investments in domestic 
operations (i.e., follow the letter but not the spirit of the regulations under the Act).  
Further, I find there is little association between the amount of tax savings firms gained 
from the Act and the tendency to spend the repatriated funds on allowed activities.   
In sum my findings suggest the following: (1) the temporary tax-holiday spurred a 
large temporary increase in repatriations, (2) AJCA provided a windfall gain to firms 
with substantial unrepatriated earnings in low-tax countries, (3) firms appear to have used 
the repatriated funds principally for stock repurchases, which is a use disallowed by the 
Act, and (4) firms enjoying disproportionately larger gains under the Act were no more 
likely than other firms to spend repatriated funds on growth-generating activities.  The 
findings of this study will be useful to policy makers and regulators in assessing the 
effectiveness of the one-time tax holiday provided by AJCA.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  The second section provides background and 
quotes from proponents and critics of AJCA as well as a review of relevant literature.  
Section three provides descriptive characteristics for the sample of firms repatriating 
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under the Act relative to benchmark firms.  Section four provides an analysis of the 
expenditures of the repatriating firms in the year of repatriation.  Section five concludes.    
Background and Literature Review 
Internal Revenue Code section 965, enacted as part of AJCA, was a temporary 
provision allowing U.S. firms to repatriate earnings from their foreign subsidiaries at a 
reduced effective tax rate provided that specified conditions and restrictions were 
satisfied. Section 965 provides that U.S. companies could elect, for one taxable year, an 
85 percent dividends received deduction for eligible dividends received from their 
foreign subsidiaries, thereby establishing a maximum effective tax rate of 5.25 percent on 
qualifying dividends (U.S. Treasury Department 2005).  Firms could elect the holiday 
period as the last tax year beginning before the date of the enactment of AJCA (October 
22, 2004) or the first taxable year beginning after that date.  Therefore, all repatriations 
under the provisions of the Act were completed by October 2006.  Analysts estimate that 
U.S. firms have repatriated approximately $300 billion under the provisions of the Act.   
In recent years, international profit growth outpaced domestic growth for U.S. 
multinational firms.  The international expansion led to record unrepatriated foreign 
profits for U.S. firms.  The quotes that follow capture the proponents‟ announced 
objectives for supporting AJCA. 
 
“Multiple studies show my repatriation provision could bring $400 billion back 
into our economy and create upward of 600,000 jobs in America in 2005, while 
reducing the deficit by $163 billion,” U.S. Representative Phil English (R-PA), a 
member of the House Ways and Means Committee, who drafted the bill.    
“Today more than at any time in our history, we operate in a global economy.  
This vote for AJCA is about fixing our international tax law and providing much 
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needed tax relief for businesses to help create jobs,” U.S. Representative David 
Wu (D-OR). 
 
“This bill provides tax relief for American businesses to further fuel economic 
growth and job creation,” U.S. Representative Jo Bonner (R-AL). 
On the other hand, there was concern that the Act would fail to meet the objective 
of providing a short-term stimulus to the economy through domestic investment.  For 
example, U.S. Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) expressed displeasure with AJCA: 
Under the guise of helping American firms, Congress has pulled a giant hoax on 
the American people.  Only in the U.S. Congress could a bill with the feel-good 
title „The American Jobs Creation Act‟, actually provide billions of dollars to 
subsidize the export of American jobs.  This bill may create jobs, but it won‟t be 
in the U.S., it will be overseas. 
 
I support reducing the tax burden on truly American firms. However, I don't 
support forcing American taxpayers to subsidize the export of their own jobs as 
this bill does. Nor do I support requiring struggling American workers and small 
businesses to subsidize Fortune 500 multinational corporations. 
Also, critics were concerned that repatriated funds would be used for nonqualified 
purposes such as distributions to shareholders.  For example, economists at J.P. Morgan 
Chase surveyed 28 large firms accounting for approximately 25% of all unrepatriated 
foreign profits.  They concluded that much of the funds returned to the U.S. would be 
used for nonqualified purposes.  Firms surveyed indicated that they would use the 
repatriated funds to repurchase stock or pay dividends, and these uses were not permitted 
under the Act.  
To assure that repatriations were used for domestic investment, firms repatriating 
under the Act were required to establish a domestic reinvestment plan stating that the 
funds would be used for qualified purposes.  A concern of the critics with regard to the 
domestic reinvestment plan was that firms were not required to either isolate the funds or 
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demonstrate that expenditures exceeded normal levels for qualified expenses.  Due to the 
fungibility of cash, it is possible that the funds were used for nonqualified uses (e.g., 
stock repurchases and dividend payments).  Overall, the loose requirements for the 
dividend reinvestment plan and the information regarding intended uses of repatriating 
firms led critics to argue that the Act would fail to stimulate domestic investment by 
firms repatriating under the Act.  
Review of Relevant Academic Literature 
Gravelle (2005) evaluates the major provisions of the AJCA and classifies them 
as good, bad or ugly based on their projected revenue gains or losses.  She concludes that 
the most significant temporary revenue loser is the one-year tax holiday for earnings 
repatriated from firms‟ foreign subsidiaries.  She gives the provision “bad marks” 
because it is unlikely to meet its objective of providing a short-run stimulus to the U.S. 
economy via domestic investment by repatriating firms.  She argues that the one-year tax 
holiday for repatriations will not meet its objective for two primary reasons:  the 
economy was already in recovery, and given the fungibility of cash coupled with the 
loosely crafted AJCA regulations, there is no reason to believe the repatriation would 
have a significant effect on U.S. domestic investment.  She also argues that the one-year 
tax holiday will encourage firms to retain funds abroad in anticipation that the tax holiday 
will be repeated in the future. 
Clausing (2005) also evaluates the international tax incentives created by the 
AJCA, and offers three main conclusions.  First, since the provision is a one-time event it 
is likely to encourage a large temporary surge in repatriations.  Second, due to the 
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fungibility of funds across uses, it is unlikely that the earmarking required by the Act will 
lead to new investments in the U.S. relative to what would have otherwise occurred.  
Third, the net result of the provision will be to make investments in low-tax countries 
more attractive.  Overall she concludes that the Act sends a confused message about the 
intention of the U.S. tax system and provides an unjustified tax gain to firms with profits 
in low tax countries.   
Blouin and Krull (2006) conduct an exploratory study to determine if firms that 
may repatriate their foreign earnings under the provisions of AJCA are likely to use the 
funds for distributions to shareholders (i.e., a usage of the funds prohibited under the 
Act).  Their sample includes over 240 firms that mention in their financial statements that 
they have repatriated, or plan to repatriate, under the provisions of the Act.  For their 
sample of potential repatriating firms, they suggest that firms may be likely to use the 
funds for a prohibited use, stock repurchases.   
The tax savings enjoyed by firms under AJCA is positively associated with the 
difference between the U.S. marginal tax rate and the tax rates prevailing in the foreign 
jurisdictions in which the firms operate.  Albring, Dzuranin and Mills (2005) estimate the 
tax savings (tax loss) of corporations (U.S. Treasury) under AJCA using disclosures in 
public financial statements.  The authors identify 282 firms that have 1) sufficient 
disclosures to estimate tax savings under the Act and 2) foreign earnings not fully 
protected by foreign tax credits.  For these firms, the authors estimate the incremental tax 
savings would be about $39 billion.  Accordingly, the tax savings available under AJCA 
appear to provide significant motivation to repatriate. 
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My study extends the existing literature in several respects.  First, I examine 
actual repatriations of firms rather than intended repatriations of firms.  The efficacy of a 
tax policy is best evaluated based on actual firm responses rather than intended or 
expressed responses.  Further, I can observe the spending of repatriated funds only in the 
case of firms that have actually repatriated.  Second, I examine the power of tax savings 
relative to capital constraints on domestic growth as repatriation incentives.  Third, to 
evaluate the effectiveness of AJCA as a domestic growth incentive, I examine whether 
the firm-level tax savings (tax loss to the U.S. Treasury) are (is) positively associated 
with the amount repatriated and whether the repatriation amounts are associated with 
changes in spending for allowed and disallowed uses under AJCA.           
In my following analyses, I examine the conditions necessary for the Act to 
achieve its policy objectives.  The necessary conditions are that, repatriating firms must 
have (1) repatriated a significant sum during the holiday period, (2) significant growth 
opportunities and (3) expended the repatriated cash pursuing those growth opportunities.  
I assume that firms had at least two motivations to repatriate under AJCA:  harvest one-
time U.S. tax savings and/or alleviate a capital constraint on domestic investment 
opportunities.   In the next section I report descriptive characteristics of repatriating firms 
versus benchmark firms to infer the motives of repatriating firms. 
Who Repatriated under AJCA and Why? 
 In the initial analysis, I compare characteristics of a large sample of repatriating 
firms to two large, overlapping samples of publicly-traded U.S. corporations.   I gather 
financial data for my samples from the annual Compustat database.  My tests utilize data 
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from fiscal years 2004 and 2005, respectively, the year prior to and following the passage 
of the Act.  Since the passage of AJCA, firms have disclosed the amounts repatriated (or 
intended to be repatriated) under the Act.  The primary sample used in this study consists 
of firms that have repatriated earnings under AJCA.  
I initially identified 418 firms that intended to repatriate foreign earnings under 
AJCA.  I identified these firms through two primary sources.  First, I identified 156 firms 
that disclosed plans to repatriate earnings in their financial statements by searching the 
EDGAR database utilizing the following search string [(10Q or 10K) and (foreign 
earnings repatriation) w/25 (American Jobs Creation Act of 2004)].  Second, I identified 
an additional 262 firms intending to repatriate under AJCA using Lexis-Nexis Business 
Wire and News Wire and Google searches using the following key words “foreign 
earnings repatriation” and “American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”.  Lastly, I searched the 
subsequent year‟s financial statements of the 418 firms to determine which firms actually 
repatriated under the AJCA.  The search confirmed that 379 firms repatriated under 
AJCA; for the 379 firms identified, I obtained the required financial data to conduct my 
analysis for 364 firms.  The 364 firms examined in this study repatriated approximately 
$283 billion under the Act.   
In Table II-1, I summarize the industry composition of the repatriating sample.  
A majority of firms repatriating under AJCA are in manufacturing industries and 
represent 68 percent of the repatriating firms.  Service companies comprise the second 
largest group of repatriating firms (12 percent of the sample), and retail companies 
comprise the third largest group of repatriating firms (6 percent of the sample).  
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Table II-1.  Industry Distribution of Firms Repatriating Foreign Earnings under the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
 
Industry Distribution of firms repatriating foreign earnings under AJCA 
 
 
SIC Code               # of Firms: 
 
1000-1999 Mining and Construction      11  
2000-2999 Manufacturing       88 
3000-3999 Manufacturing       159 
4000-4999 Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas   14 
5000-5999 Wholesale, Retail       23 
6000-6999 Financial, Insurance, Real Estate     24 
7000-7999 Hotel, Services       34 
8000-8999 Services        10 
9000-9999 Public Administration       1 
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I compare firms repatriating under the Act (repatriating firms) to 1) all non-
repatriating multinational U.S. firms and 2) the Compustat universe of publicly-traded 
U.S. non-repatriating corporations.  I exclude firms with negative book value of equity 
and firms with missing net income data.  My final sample consists of 364 repatriating 
firms and 5,571 non-repatriating firms with the required financial data. 
Methodology 
 To determine whether the repatriating firms differ from the non-repatriating firms, 
I compare the attributes of the three samples statistically using a parametric t-test and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  Table II-2 presents data for the repatriating, non-repatriating 
multinational, and Compustat universe of U.S. firm samples.  Statistics reported in all 
tables are based only on those firms that have sufficient data available to calculate each 
specific metric.  The number of observations for each statistic is included in the tables. 
Because I complement the means test with a nonparametric test, I do not winsorize or 
otherwise transform the raw data reported in Table II-2; hence, some means are heavily 
influenced by outliers.  I provide minimum and maximum values as well as the standard 
error for each variable for the repatriating firms so that the influence of outliers can be 
inferred.  To control for the effect of outliers in my regression models I winsorize 
continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels of the distributions for each variable. 
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Table II-2. Descriptive Statistics for Firms Repatriating under AJCA, Non-repatriating Firms with Foreign 
Operations, and the Compustat Universe of Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N N
Repatriations
Repatriations 364 776        2,628       0.60 131       37,000          N/A N/A N/A N/A
Repatriations / total assets 364 0.09       0.10         0.00      0.06      0.59              N/A N/A N/A N/A
Operating characteristics
Size 364 21,089   112,670   5.37 2,546    1,484,101     1,454   10,263   ** 474      ** 5,571   8,053   ** 374      **
Foreign ROA 287 0.047     0.039       (0.052)   0.039    0.172            1,454   0.015     ** 0.010   ** 1,454   0.015   ** 0.010   **
Tax characteristics
Foreign tax rate (FTR) 155 0.271     0.105       0.062    0.274    0.609            309      0.330     ** 0.324   ** 309      0.330   ** 0.324   **
Marginal tax rate (MTR) 260 0.332     0.064       0.004    0.350    0.382            738      0.283     ** 0.350   ** 2,372   0.269   ** 0.350   **
Tax difference (MTR - FTR) 119 0.072     0.108       -0.44 0.073    0.288            209      0.005     ** 0.013   ** 209      0.005   ** 0.013   **
Growth characteristics
CAPEX / total assets 364 0.038     0.032       0.00 0.020    0.244            1,454   0.040     ** 0.027   ** 4,870   0.045   ** 0.031   **
Growth 323 0.946     4.18         -0.59 0.326    68.59            1,072   1.233     ** 0.344   3,692   2.881   ** 0.391   **
R&D / total assets 263 0.045     0.042       0.00 0.033    0.206            1,004   0.079     ** 0.050   ** 2,808   0.092   ** 0.039   **
($ amounts in millions)
** indicates significantly different from the repatriating sample at the 5% level.
1
 non-repartriating firms are multinational firms that did not repatriate under AJCA.
Variable definitions: Size equals total assets, Foreign ROA equals foreign pre-tax income divided by total assets, FTR is the sum of foreign current tax expense
from year t-4 to t divided by the sum of foreign pretax income form year t-4 to t, MTR is obtained from John Graham's website, faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html,   
CAPEX is capital expenditures, Growth equals 5-year sales growth.
Mean Median
TABLE 2
2004 Descriptive statistics for firms repatriating under AJCA, 
Repatriating firms Compustat Universe
Mean Median
non-repatriating firms with foreign operations, and the Compustat universe 
Non-repatriating firms
1
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Repatriating and Non-repatriating Firm Characteristics 
For the 364 firms comprising the repatriating sample, the per-firm average 
amount repatriated under the Act was $776 million, and the average repatriation equaled 
9 percent of total assets.  The median repatriation amount was $131 million and equaled 
6 percent of total assets.   
 Based on the parametric t-test and a nonparametric medians test I find the 
repatriating sample differs from the non-repatriating samples in terms of size and 
profitability of foreign operations.    Repatriating firms are larger than non-repatriating 
multinational firms and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms based on total assets; for 
2004, mean total assets were $21 billion, $10 billion and $8 billion, respectively.  
Foreign operations of repatriating firms are also significantly more profitable than 
multinational non-repatriating firms.  Mean foreign ROA (foreign pretax income scaled 
by total assets) is 0.047 and 0.015 for repatriating and non-repatriating firms, 
respectively.   
The repatriation stimulus under the Act was the reduction in taxes due upon 
repatriation of foreign earnings during the holiday period.  The magnitude of this 
stimulus is a function of the difference between each firm‟s domestic marginal tax rate 
and the tax rates prevailing in the foreign jurisdictions in which the firm operates.  The 
next section compares the marginal tax rate and foreign tax rate of repatriating and non-
repatriating firms.   
The data in Table II-2 suggest (based on both parametric and nonparametric 
tests) that the mean foreign tax rate of repatriating firms is significantly lower than the 
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mean foreign tax rate of non-repatriating multinational firms.  This result supports the 
assertion that firms operating in tax havens were more likely to repatriate under the 
provisions of AJCA because the magnitude of tax savings was larger for such firms.  
The average foreign tax rate is 27 percent and 33 percent respectively for repatriating 
and non-repatriating multinational firms.  Also, the marginal U.S. tax rate for 
repatriating firms is significantly higher than that of both non-repatriating multinational 
firms and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms.  The average U.S. marginal tax rate is 
33.2 percent 28.3 percent, and 26.9 percent for repatriating, non-repatriating 
multinational firms, and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms, respectively.  The results 
are consistent with the logic that firms with a greater positive difference between their 
marginal and foreign tax rates were more likely to repatriate under the Act because of 
the larger tax benefits such firms could realize during the holiday period.      
The intent of AJCA was to not only encourage firms to repatriate their foreign 
earnings but also to cause those firms to invest the foreign earnings in domestic 
operations.  For the Act to accomplish the objectives voiced by its proponents, 
repatriating firms must have (1) repatriated a significant sum during the holiday period, 
(2) significant growth opportunities and (3) expended the repatriated cash pursuing those 
growth opportunities.  In the next section I examine the repatriating and non-repatriating 
firms‟ historical growth characteristics to provide initial evidence on the likelihood that 
repatriations were or will be used for domestic investment.     
 The regulations under AJCA require firms to invest repatriations under the Act in 
domestic operations.  Ceteris paribus, firms with greater growth opportunities would be 
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better able and more likely to utilize their repatriations for domestic investment.  
Therefore, I compare the repatriating and non-repatriating firms based on growth metrics 
to help assess repatriating firms‟ growth-driven capital needs, and hence, whether 
repatriating firms were likely compliant with the domestic reinvestment requirement of 
the Act.   
The growth proxies used include asset-scaled capital expenditures (Capex), five-
year average sales growth (Growth), and research and development spending scaled by 
total assets (R&D).  Results are reported in the bottom panel of Table II-2.  Capex is 
greater for non-repatriating multinational firms and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms 
than for the repatriating firms (based on both parametric and nonparametric tests) in 
2004 suggesting that, proportionally, non-repatriating firms enjoyed greater growth 
opportunities than repatriating firms.  The mean (median) size-scaled capital 
expenditures were 0.038 (0.020), 0.040 (0.027), and .045 (.031) for the repatriating, non-
repatriating multinational firms, and Compustat universe of U.S. firms, respectively.  Of 
further note, the data suggest U.S. firms with only domestic operations have higher 
growth rates than U.S. multinationals.  One implication of this finding is that the most 
effective growth-inducing tax policy might have targeted this set of firms. 
Repatriating firms also have lower growth opportunities based on firms‟ 
historical mean sales growth (Growth).  Mean Growth was higher for non-repatriating 
multinational firms and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms than repatriating firms. 
The mean (median) growth rate was 0.946 (.326), 1.233 (.344), and 2.881 (.391) for 
repatriating, non-repatriating multinational firms, and the Compustat universe of U.S. 
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firms, respectively.  The lower growth rate for repatriating firms suggests that, all else 
equal, these firms would be less likely to utilize the repatriated funds for domestic 
investment than other U.S. firms.   
Innovation drives growth opportunities and research and development (R&D) is a 
common proxy for innovation.  For 2004, I find R&D expense scaled by total assets was 
significantly greater (based on both parametric and nonparametric tests) for non-
repatriating multinational firms and the Compustat universe of U.S. firms than for 
repatriating firms, suggesting that, proportionally, repatriating firms have lower growth-
generating expenditures.  Mean (median) R&D expenses in 2004 scaled by total assets 
were 0.045 (0.033), 0.079 (0.05), .092 (.039) for the repatriating, non-repatriating 
multinational firms, and Compustat universe of U.S. firms, respectively.    
  The preceding analysis demonstrates, consistent with Clausing‟s (2005) 
prediction, that AJCA was successful in encouraging firms to repatriate a large amount 
of foreign earnings ($283 billion), but it also suggests that repatriating firms have 
relatively lower growth opportunities.  Accordingly, skepticism is warranted regarding 
repatriating firms‟ use of the repatriated funds for disallowed activities.  In the following 
section, I explore the firms‟ motivations for repatriating under the Act.  
Did Repatriations under AJCA Increase with Tax Savings and Firm Growth 
Opportunities?  
  In the preceding section the evidence suggests that firms repatriated a large sum, 
$283 billion, of foreign earnings under AJCA.  This finding satisfies one of the 
conditions (firms must repatriate a large sum during the holiday period) for AJCA to be 
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a successful tax policy.  The other conditions are that (1) the repatriating firms have 
significant growth opportunities and (2) that the repatriated funds be expended in pursuit 
of those opportunities.  
My findings, based on a portfolio of growth indicators reported in Table II-2, 
suggest firms repatriating under the AJCA have growth opportunities that are inferior to 
the average publicly-traded U.S. firm.  These findings increase the skepticism that firms 
expended repatriated funds on qualified expenses and increase the tension between the 
alternative motivations for firms to repatriate under the Act (reap the tax savings and/or 
gather cash to fund capital-constrained growth opportunities).       
I develop a logit model to assess the association of tax and growth characteristics 
with the decision to repatriate.  Specifically, I estimate the following logit model: 
(II.1) Repatriatei = β 1 Sizei + β2 Foreign ROAi + β3 Tax differencei + β 4 Capexi + β5 
Growthi + β6 Research & Developmenti +  εi  
where: 
Repatriate  =  1 for firms repatriating under the provisions of 
 AJCA; 0 otherwise 
Size    =     log of total assets 
Foreign ROA    = foreign pretax income scaled by total assets 
Tax difference   = marginal U.S. tax rate – effective foreign tax rate 
Capex    =  capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
Growth   = five-year average sales growth rate (1999-2004) 
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Research & Development = research & development expense scaled by total 
     assets. 
 
I include Size and Foreign ROA to control for unspecified size effects and effects 
of foreign profitability on repatriations.  Tax difference is included to capture the tax 
savings available for repatriations under AJCA.  Capex and Growth are included in the 
model to capture historical indicators of growth and Research & Development is 
included as a forward-looking indicator of growth. 
I estimate model II.1 on the observations comprising the repatriating and non-
repatriating multinational samples reported in Table II-2.  The overall sample includes 
303 firms with data sufficient to estimate the model; of these 303 firms, 111 repatriated.  
The results of estimating model II.1 appear in Table II-3.   
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Table II-3.  Logistic Regression of Repatriation Choice of Firms with Foreign 
Operations   
 
 
a
 To control for the effect of outliers, variables used in the logistic regression are winsorized at the 1
st
 and  
99
th
 percentile. 
Coefficient (Chi-Squared)
Variables
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
Size 0.37 *** (20.32)
Foreign ROA 12.04 *** (9.49)
TAX CHARACTERISTIC
Tax Difference 2.80 *** (5.53)
GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS
Capital Expenditures -4.52 (-1.1681)
Growth -0.41 ** (-4.2382)
Research and Development 5.78 (2.33)
Pseudo R
2
17%
Correct Prediction 75%
***, ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent, and 5 percent levels, respectively.
TABLE 3
Logistic regression
a
 of repatriation choice of firms with foreign operations
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Size and Foreign ROA are both positively associated with the likelihood of 
repatriating.  The tax difference variable is significantly positive suggesting that those 
firms characterized as having the largest gaps between their marginal U.S. tax rates and 
their effective foreign tax rates were more likely to repatriate.  Surprisingly, of the three 
growth proxies, only the historical sales growth rate (Growth) is statistically significant 
and it is negatively associated with the likelihood of repatriating.  Thus, there is no 
evidence based on the estimation of model (II.1) that firms with higher growth prospects 
were more likely to repatriate under AJCA.  Accordingly, the model (II.1) results tend to 
support the supposition that firms were more motivated to repatriate under AJCA to reap 
tax savings rather than to fund domestic growth opportunities. 
The most convincing evidence that AJCA was successful as a growth-inducing 
policy would demonstrate positive relationships among amounts repatriated, tax savings 
enjoyed under the Act, opportunity for growth, and growth-generating spending during 
the holiday period.  Overall, the results presented in Table II-3, suggest an overall 
positive relationship between likelihood of repatriating and tax savings under the Act.  
However, the results also suggest that growth opportunities are not positively associated 
with the decision to repatriate.  This result creates doubt as to whether repatriated funds 
were used to fund growth.  Next, I examine whether foreign earnings repatriated under 
AJCA were, on average, used for qualified expenses (i.e., investment in domestic growth 
activities). 
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What Expenditures Increased in the Year of Repatriation? 
The results of the preceding analysis suggest that firms repatriated large sums of 
foreign earnings under AJCA to exploit the temporary tax holiday.  Under the Act, firms 
are not permitted to use repatriations for distributions to shareholders, and are required 
to invest the funds in domestic operations or retire debt.  To investigate whether firms 
repatriating under AJCA used the repatriated funds for growing domestic operations or 
for distributions to shareholders, I compare expenditures for qualified and nonqualified 
uses for the fiscal year before and during the AJCA holiday period. These results are 
reported in Table II-4. 
Table II-4 presents six lines of data for repatriating firms only.  The first four 
lines represent allowed uses of funds repatriated under AJCA and the last two lines 
represent disallowed uses.  Each “use” variable is scaled by total assets.  Each line shows 
expenditures in the year prior to and the year of the AJCA holiday period as well as 
mean and median differences between the prior period and holiday period expenditures.  
The results in Table II-4 suggest there were insignificant changes between the year prior 
to and the year of repatriation in debt level, research & development spending, capital 
expenditures, and acquisitions for repatriating firms.  These results indicate that firms 
repatriating under the Act did not use the repatriated funds to significantly increase their 
spending for these permitted uses in the year of repatriation.  For nonqualified uses there 
was an insignificant increase in the mean level of dividends, but the increase in the mean 
level of stock repurchases was highly significant.  In sum, the results suggest that the 
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only significant increase in the year of repatriation was for a nonqualified use, stock 
repurchases.   
 Next, I develop a regression model which I estimate on the cross-section of 
repatriating firms to determine if the relative amounts repatriated are associated with 
firm growth opportunities, tax savings under the act, and other firm-specific variables:   
(II.2) Repatriationsi = B0 + B1 Growthi + B2 Capexi + B3 Research & Developmenti + 
B4 Debt ratioi + B5 Tax differencei + B6 Foreign ROAi + B7 Cashi + B8 Sizei  + εi   
Where: 
Repatriations   = Amount repatriated under AJCA scaled by total 
  assets 
 
Growth   = five-year average sales growth rate (1999-2004) 
Capex    =  capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
Research & Development = research & development expense scaled by total 
     assets 
Debt ratio   = total debt scaled by total assets 
Tax difference  = U.S. marginal tax rate minus effective foreign tax 
  rate 
Foreign ROA  = foreign pretax income scaled by total assets 
Cash    = cash balance scaled by total assets 
Size    = log of total assets 
  
25 
2
5
 
Table II-4.  Changes in Qualified Uses and Nonqualified Uses Pre- and Post- AJCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions: 
Debt    = debt level scaled by total assets 
Research & Development  = R&D expense scaled by total assets 
Capital Expenditures  =  capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
Acquisitions   = corporate acquisitions scaled by total assets  
Dividends   = dividends paid scaled by total assets 
Stock Repurchases  = stock repurchases scaled by total assets 
 
 
Change in uses for sample of 364 firms repatriating under AJCA:
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Debt 17.83% 16.57% 17.70% 16.78% 0.13% -0.21%
Research & Development 3.26% 1.36% 3.28% 1.63% -0.03% -0.26%
Capital Expenditures 4.19% 3.32% 3.87% 3.07% 0.31% 0.26%
Acquisitions 3.62% 0.13% 3.28% 0.20% 0.35% -0.08%
Dividends 1.55% 0.60% 1.31% 0.53% 0.24% 0.07%
Stock Repurchases 4.61% 1.03% 3.31% 0.36% 1.30% *** 0.67% ***
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
TABLE 4
Changes in qualified uses and nonqualified uses 
pre- and post- American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA)
2005 2004 Difference (2005-2004)
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In this regression, I test for associations between the amount of earnings 
repatriated, proxies for allowed uses under the Act, tax savings under the Act, cash 
availability, and controls.  Growth, Capex, and Research & development are included to 
capture associations between repatriations and historical and future firm growth proxies.  
Debt ratio is included to capture repatriation incentives associated with debt reduction.  
Tax difference is included to proxy for the tax savings captured by repatriating under the 
Act.  Foreign ROA is included as a control for profitability of foreign operations, Cash is 
included to capture cash constraints motivating repatriations; and Size is included to 
control for unspecified firm size effects. 
 I report results of estimating model II.2 in Table II-5.  Similar to the results of 
estimating model II.1, the growth proxies are not significantly associated with the 
amount of foreign earnings repatriated.  Thus, a firm‟s growth opportunity set appears to 
be unrelated to both the decision to repatriate (Table II-3) and the amount to repatriate  
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under AJCA.  Leverage, as proxied by Debt ratio, also is not significantly associated 
with the amount of earnings repatriated under AJCA.  The proxy for tax savings, Tax  
difference, is significantly, and positively, associated with the relative amount of 
earnings repatriated.  Thus, the tax savings appear to be an influential variable in both 
the decision to repatriate and the amount to repatriate.  Not surprisingly, the profitability 
of foreign operations, as measured by Foreign ROA, is positively associated with the 
relative amounts repatriated.  This result indicates that firms generating higher foreign 
profits have greater capacity to repatriate foreign earnings.  The cash balance is not 
associated with the relative amount of funds repatriated, nor is size associated with the 
relative amount repatriated. 
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Table II-5.  Coefficients from a Regression of Repatriations under AJCA on 
Motives for Repatriating   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 To control for the effect of outliers, variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and  99
th
 percentile. 
Variable Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 0.079 1.361
Growth 0.002 0.119
Capex -0.271 -0.814
Research & Development 0.342 1.138
Debt ratio -0.048 -0.486
Tax difference 0.208 ** 2.243
Foreign ROA 0.794 *** 3.144
Cash 0.062 0.909
Size -0.005 -0.724
Number of observations 111
Adjusted R
2
22%
***,** indicates significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively.
TABLE 5
Coefficients and (t-statistics) from a regression
a
 of repatriations
under AJCA on motives for repatriating
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The results of estimating model II.2 suggest that saving taxes rather than 
addressing capital constraints was the key motive influencing the amount of earnings to 
repatriate under AJCA.  This finding raises further suspicions about the ultimate 
disposition of amounts repatriated under AJCA.  Some firms repatriating under the Act 
denied there was intent to use the repatriated funds for nonqualified uses;  “Of course 
(repatriations) are not being used for (stock repurchases), because that‟s not something 
they can be used for” said Jacqueline Berry, a spokesperson for 3M, a firm that 
repatriated $1.7 billion under the Act.  Although the 3M spokesperson made this 
assertion, 3M increased its level of stock repurchases to about $2.4 billion in the 12 
months ending June 2005, compared with approximately $1.5 billion in the comparable 
period a year earlier.  Also, HCA Inc. recently announced it would repatriate about $190 
million under the Act and spent $2.5 billion repurchasing stock in the 12-month period 
through June 2005, over twice the amount spent in the same period a year earlier.   
Other firms stated their intent to comply with the letter of the regulations but not 
the spirit of the regulations.  For example, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. 
claims that it was a coincidence it approved a $1 billion stock repurchase plan on the 
same day it announced it was repatriating $550 million from a foreign subsidiary. Alisa 
Rosenberg, a spokeswoman for Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., of White 
Plains, N.Y., stated that Starwood would use the repatriated funds for uses qualified 
under the Act, such as training and capital expenditures.  “But what (the Act) does,” 
Rosenberg said, “is it brings money over to be used for those types of things, which frees 
up money that would have been used for hiring and training.”  The argument that the 
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repatriations would be used for qualified purposes under the Act and “freed up” funds 
used for nonqualified uses explicitly demonstrates the concern of AJCA critics.  
 To assess whether there is an association between repatriations and changes in 
spending during the holiday period, I estimate model (II.3) using only the sample of 
repatriating firms: 
(II.3) Repatriationsi = B0 + B1 Change in Debti + B2 Change in R&Di + B3 Change in 
Capexi + B4 Change in acquisitionsi + B5 Change in dividendsi + B6 Change in 
repurchasesi + B7 Change in cashi + B8 Sizei  + εi 
Where: 
Repatriations = Amount repatriated under AJCA scaled by total assets 
Change in debt = 2004 to 2005 change in debt level scaled by total assets  
Change in R & D = 2004 to 2005 change in research & development  
    expense scaled by total assets 
Change in Capex =  2004 to 2005 change in capital expenditures scaled  
    by total assets 
Change in acquisitions = 2004 to 2005 change in corporate acquisitions   
    scaled by total assets 
Change in dividends = 2004 to 2005 change in dividends paid scaled by  
    total assets 
Change in repurchases = 2004 to 2005 change in stock repurchases scaled by total assets 
Change in cash = 2004 to 2005 change in cash balance scaled by total assets 
Size = log of total assets. 
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The intent of this regression is to find associations between amounts repatriated 
and changes in corporate spending.  The first four independent variables represent 
allowed uses under AJCA.  If repatriated funds were used to reduce debt, I should find a 
negative association between Repatriations and Change in debt level.  If repatriated 
funds were expended on research and development, capital improvements, and 
acquisitions, I expect to find a positive association between Change in R & D, Change in 
Capex, and Change in acquisitions. If the repatriated funds were used for the disallowed 
purposes of paying dividends and repurchasing stock, I expect a positive association 
between Repatriations and Change in dividends and Change in repurchases.  Finally, if 
the repatriations were used to increase available cash, I expect a positive association 
between Repatriations and Change in cash.  I include Size as a control for unspecified 
size effects. 
 Results of estimating equation II.3 appear in Table II-6.  Changes in the allowed 
uses of funds repatriated under AJCA are not significantly, positively associated with the 
amount repatriated.  Among the allowed uses, only the coefficient for Change in Capex 
is statistically significant and the association is unexpectedly negative.  Likewise there is 
no association between the change in dividends and the amount repatriated.  However, 
there is a statistically significant positive association between the change in stock 
repurchases and the amount repatriated.  Although the change in cash is positively 
associated with the amount repatriated, the association is statistically insignificant.  
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Table II-6.  Coefficients from a Regression of Repatriations on Allowed and 
Disallowed Uses under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 To control for the effect of outliers, variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and  99
th
 percentile. 
Variable Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 0.100 *** 3.273
Change in debt -0.004 -0.075
Change in R&D -0.314 -0.598
Change in Capex -0.750 * -1.844
Change in acquisitions 0.060 0.765
Change in dividends 0.898 1.340
Change in repurchases 0.245 *** 3.010
Change in cash 0.130 1.376
Size -0.002 -0.475
Number of observatons 272
Adjusted R
2
3%
***,* indicates significance at 1 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
TABLE 6
Coefficients and (t-statistics) from a regression
a
 of repatriations
on allowed and disallowed uses under AJCA
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Putting the results reported in Table II-6 in the context of my prior results, the 
evidence suggests firms repatriated significant sums under the tax holiday provided by 
AJCA, but the evidence also suggests, the funds were largely spent on a disallowed use, 
stock repurchases.  I conclude my study in the following section. 
Summary 
From statements offered by proponents of AJCA, I infer that three conditions 
must be met for AJCA to be considered successful:  (1) a substantial amount of funds 
were repatriated during the holiday period, (2) there must be significant growth 
opportunities for repatriating firms, and (3) repatriating firms must have spent 
repatriated funds on uses permitted under the Act.  
My results suggest that firms did repatriate substantial sums during AJCA‟s 
holiday period.  The results of this study show that 364 firms repatriated $283 billion 
under the Act.   However, compared to two large samples of non-repatriating firms, I 
find that repatriating firms have relatively constrained growth opportunities, and this is a 
logical explanation for why firms failed to use their repatriations for domestic 
investment.  There is also anecdotal evidence that suggests firms did not need the 
repatriated cash to increase domestic investment.  For example, Stephen Levy, director 
of the Center of Continuing Study of the California Economy, stated that modest job 
growth in high tech firms in California during 2006 is attributable to demand rather than 
capital constraints:   
These firms don‟t have any trouble raising capital.  So getting more dollars from 
overseas wouldn‟t cause them to create jobs in the United States.  Some firms 
taking advantage of AJCA have actually cut jobs.  For example, Hewlett-Packard 
announced a massive layoff of 14,500 employees in 2005. 
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The results of my study are consistent with the observation of Mr. Levy.  A final 
point is that there appears to be little relationship between the amount of tax savings (or 
amount of tax loss to the U.S. Treasury) a firm enjoyed upon repatriation and the growth 
opportunity set available to the firm.  Further, there appears to be no systematic 
relationship between the growth opportunity sets of repatriating firms and the tendency 
to use repatriated cash to fund growth.   
In summary, I find that the act was successful in inducing firms to repatriate a 
significant amount of cash held in foreign jurisdictions.  However, the Act appears to 
have been targeted at firms with growth opportunity sets that were inferior to other U.S. 
firms and to have ineffectively influenced firms to spend the repatriated funds on growth 
opportunities. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LOCK-OUT EFFECT OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM: AN 
EVALUATION AROUND THE ONE-YEAR TAX HOLIDAY FOR 
REPATRIATIONS PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 
2004 
Introduction 
 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the AJCA, the Act) became law on 
October 22, 2004.  The impetus for passing the Act was the need to repeal the 
extraterritorial income exclusion (ETI) that had been ruled an illegal export subsidy by 
the World Trade Organization.  Prior to the passage of the Act, U.S. export subsidies had 
repeatedly been ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization.  Since the U.S. had not 
adequately remedied the export subsidy issues in the past, the European Union levied 
retaliatory tariffs on over 1,600 U.S. products beginning in March 2004 until the ETI 
export subsidy was repealed by the United States government (Clausing 2005).  The 
tariffs began at five percent in March of 2004, and increased by one percent per month 
thereafter and stood at 12 percent when the Act was passed removing the ETI export 
subsidy.  In creating legislation that purports to be revenue neutral, the U.S. government 
offset the revenue generated through the repeal of the ETI export subsidy with 
provisions under the Act that offered several tax breaks.  For example, the tax breaks 
under the Act include a deduction for U.S. domestic production income and a one-year 
tax holiday for repatriations.  This study evaluates the one-year tax holiday for 
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repatriations provided under the Act and its influence on the “lock-out effect”, defined 
below, of the U.S. international tax system. 
Under the U.S. international tax system, U.S. multinational firms are generally 
required to record U.S. income taxes on foreign earnings in excess of foreign taxes paid 
in the current period.  The amount of U.S. tax liability recorded on the foreign earnings 
equals the difference between the U.S. and foreign tax rates.  For example, assume a 
U.S. tax rate of 35 percent, and two firms operating in two foreign countries.  Firm A 
operates in county L that has an income tax rate of 5 percent, and firm B operates in a 
country that has an income tax rate of 30 percent.  The U.S. tax liability recorded for 
company A and company B will be equal to the difference between their domestic and 
foreign tax rates.  Therefore, firm A and firm B will record a U.S. tax liability of 30 
percent (.35 - .05) and 5 percent (.35 - .30), respectively.  This example demonstrates 
that the U.S. tax liability correspondingly increases to offset any tax savings received for 
U.S. multinational firms operating in low-tax foreign jurisdictions.   
If U.S. multinational firms were permitted to defer the recognition of the U.S. tax 
liability on the foreign earnings, they would receive increased financial reporting and tax 
costs savings as the tax rate charged in the foreign country decreased.  Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23) provides such an opportunity to defer the 
recognition of the U.S. tax liability under the U.S. international tax system.  Specifically, 
if the foreign earnings will be reinvested in the foreign subsidiary for an indefinite 
period of time, the earnings may be designated as permanently reinvested (PRE).  Under 
the PRE designation a firm is not required to accrue a deferred tax liability for those 
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earnings.  The PRE designation for foreign earnings creates an incentive for U.S. 
multinational firms to defer the repatriation of their foreign earnings from low-tax 
countries, and the incentive to defer repatriations to the United States to avoid the U.S. 
tax costs is commonly referred to as the “lock-out effect” of the U.S. international tax 
system.          
 To examine the lock-out effect, this study will investigate the determinants of 
PRE and the changes in PRE for firms that repatriated under the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004.  Firms PRE can change for a wide variety of reasons, and changes in PRE 
can significantly affect earnings and the amount of taxes paid to the IRS.  For example, 
in 2001, Pfizer generated $6 billion in foreign pretax income and incurred a foreign 
income tax expense of $900 million.  By classifying $4 billion of the foreign earnings as 
permanently reinvested in 2001, Pfizer reduced its income tax expense for financial and 
tax reporting purposes by $1 billion (De Waegenaere and Sansing 2006).  The Pfizer 
example suggests that firms in low-tax foreign jurisdictions may be motivated to retain 
earnings abroad specifically to avoid paying and/or recognizing the U.S. tax costs 
associated with the foreign earnings (i.e., the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system).    
Prior research suggests that firms use the PRE designation for purposes other 
than to allocate foreign earnings for reinvestment into their foreign operations.  Krull 
(2004) conducts a study to examine whether firms use the PRE designation to manage 
reported earnings and finds that firms use the PRE designation to opportunistically 
manage earnings.  Specifically, Krull (2004) finds that year-to-year changes in the 
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amount reported as PRE is positively associated to the difference between analysts‟ 
forecasts and pre-managed earnings.  De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) demonstrate 
that firms that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations 
accumulate financial assets under the PRE designation to avoid recording taxes that 
would be due on the foreign earnings.  Foley et al. (2007) conduct a study to investigate 
why firms hold excessive amount of cash.  Consistent with the predictions from De 
Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) model, the authors find that repatriation tax costs are 
positively associated with the firms‟ cash holdings in their low-tax foreign subsidiaries.  
The extant research suggests that the lock-out effect of the U.S. repatriation tax is the 
primary motive for some firms deferring the repatriation of their foreign earnings.  
Motivated by this stream of research, my paper will evaluate the lock-out effect of firms 
that repatriated under the Act around the one-time tax holiday for repatriations. 
The one-time tax holiday provides an interesting setting to test the lock-out effect 
of the U.S. international tax system.  The one-time tax holiday for repatriations provided 
under the Act permits firms to elect for one taxable year an 85 percent dividend received 
deduction for dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries (U.S. Treasury 
Department 2005).   The one eligible year to repatriate under the Act is either the year of 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 or the year following the Act (e.g., for calendar 
year taxpayers the eligible year is either 2004 or 2005).  The one-time tax holiday 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate how the firms repatriating under the Act 
change their lock-out behavior around a temporary and dramatic change in the 
repatriation tax rate.  Therefore, I will conduct an event study to examine the lock-out 
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effect for firms repatriating under the Act.  My study will evaluate the lock-out effect for 
firms repatriating under the Act before, during and after the one-time tax holiday.  
Consistent with theory, I expect that firms will have accumulated financial assets prior to 
the one-time tax holiday and will significantly reduce (increase) their level of PRE 
during (after) the one-time tax holiday (Clausing 2005, Gravelle 20005, De Waegenaere 
and Sansing 2006). 
 I investigate three sets of hypotheses around the one-time tax holiday for firms 
repatriating under the Act to examine the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system.  The three sets of hypotheses I examine will evaluate the firms‟ lock-out 
behavior in the year before, during and after the one-time tax holiday.  The tax-holiday 
provides an opportunity to investigate the extent to which U.S. multinational firms‟ 
accumulated foreign earnings in an effort to avoid recognizing the U.S. tax cost.  In their 
model De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) demonstrate that firms repatriating under the 
Act had reached their optimal level of investment in operating assets and to avoid 
recognizing U.S. tax costs accumulated foreign earnings abroad in cash.  This study will 
provide evidence to suggest that the U.S. international tax system encouraged firms to 
not only accumulate their foreign earnings as PRE but also to accumulate those earnings 
in cash prior to and after the one-time tax holiday.  Consistent with prior research, I 
expect that the cash holdings and repatriation tax costs will be positively associated with 
the firms‟ level of PRE in the year prior to the one-time tax holiday.  For the sample of 
firms repatriating under the Act, I also expect that the change in PRE will be positively 
associated with both the change in cash holdings and the change in the repatriation tax 
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costs in the year of repatriation and in the year following repatriation.  My predictions 
are consistent with prior literature that suggests that the one-time tax holiday will cause a 
temporary surge in repatriations and effectively make the lock-out behavior more 
desirable in the future (Clausing 2005, Gravelle 2005, De Waegenaere and Sansing 
2006).   
 I hand-collect annual financial statement data for firms that repatriated under the 
one-time tax holiday for the year prior to, during and after the tax holiday.  I focus on 
annual financial statement data since my event is the one-year tax holiday.  For my 
sample firms I collect the amount repatriated under the tax holiday, the tax expense 
related to these repatriations, and the level of PRE.  My final sample contains 195 firms 
with the required data to conduct my analysis. 
 I estimate an ordinary least squares regression model to test my three sets of 
hypotheses.  My first set of hypotheses is tested in the year prior to repatriation under the 
one-time tax holiday.  I expect a positive association between PRE and the explanatory 
variables, repatriation tax costs and cash holdings.  First, as expected, I find that the level 
of PRE is positively associated with the tax costs of repatriation.  Second, as expected, I 
also find that the cash holdings are positively associated with the level of PRE prior to 
repatriation under the tax holiday.  Consistent with the predictions of prior research (e.g., 
De Waegenaere and Sansing 2006, Foley et al. 2006), I find that prior to the one-time tax 
holiday some firms appear to have accumulated financial assets in their foreign 
subsidiaries to avoid recording the U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings.  For my sample 
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of firms, the U.S. international tax system may have trapped approximately $339 billion 
of foreign earnings abroad prior to the one-time tax holiday provided under the Act. 
 My second set of hypotheses is tested in the year in which firms repatriated under 
the one-time tax holiday.  Firms that appear to be experiencing the lock-out effect of the 
U.S. international tax system repatriated approximately $200 billion and paid 
repatriation taxes of approximately $10 billion under the one-time tax holiday provided 
by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  As expected, I find that the change in PRE 
is positively associated with the change in the repatriation tax costs for these firms.  This 
result is consistent with the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  More 
specifically, the level of PRE decreases with the reduction in the repatriation tax costs 
suggesting that the earnings were trapped abroad due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. 
international tax system.  Also, as expected, I find that the change in PRE is positively 
associated with the change in cash holdings.  This result is consistent with De 
Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) theoretical prediction that firms that have reached 
their optimal level of investment in foreign operations begin to accumulate foreign 
earnings as financial assets until they can be repatriated at a more advantageous 
repatriation tax costs (e.g., during a tax holiday).   
My third set of hypotheses is tested in the year following the one-year tax 
holiday.  As expected, I find that the change in PRE is positively associated with the 
change in the repatriation tax costs.  In other words, firms increase their level of PRE as 
the repatriation tax increases back to its pre-holiday rate.  The firms increased their level 
of PRE by approximately $78 billion in the year following the one-time tax holiday.  
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This finding suggests that the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system is 
immediately reestablished in the year following the one-year tax holiday.  However, 
contrary to expectations, the change in PRE is not associated with the change in cash 
holdings in the year following the tax holiday.  There are at least two possible 
explanations for not obtaining support for the cash holdings hypothesis in the year 
following the tax holiday.  One, I do not have complete financial statement data for all 
firms in the year following the tax holiday; therefore, statistical power may be an issue.  
Second, firms dramatically changed their cash holdings between the U.S. parent and 
foreign subsidiary during the tax holiday.  Therefore, a one year period may not have 
provided adequate time for firms to reestablish their normal pre-holiday cash holdings 
behavior.  For example, firms dramatically increased their share repurchases after the tax 
holiday (Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 2006) hence the increase in cash 
holdings in foreign subsidiaries may have been partially offset by decreases in the cash 
holdings of the U.S. parent.  Overall, I obtain results for five of the six hypotheses 
providing strong evidence that the U.S. international tax system causes a lock-out effect 
for foreign earnings from low-tax countries. 
 The findings of this study will provide useful information to many parties 
including academic researchers, regulators, and policy makers.  First, the findings of this 
study support the predictions of economist as to the impact of the one-time tax holiday 
(Clausing 2005, Gravelle 2005).  That is, the study suggest that the one-time tax holiday 
will cause firms to repeat their lock-out behavior since an expectation now exist for the 
tax holiday to be repeated in the future.  This study also provides support for the De 
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Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) theoretical prediction that U.S. multinational firms 
that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations will accumulate 
their foreign earnings in financial assets in order to avoid the U.S. tax costs.  Second, the 
findings of this study will provide useful information to regulators in assessing the 
effectiveness of the regulations in assuring that the repatriations were utilized as 
intended by the U.S. government.  Third, the results of this study will provide useful 
information to policy makers.  More specifically, the results of this study suggest that the 
U.S. international tax system does cause a lock-out effect for foreign earnings from low-
tax countries.  The information provided by this study will be useful in debates regarding 
the most appropriate method in which to tax U.S. multinational firms‟ foreign earnings 
(e.g., evaluating the residential versus territorial tax systems). 
 The next section discusses background research and motivates my hypotheses.  
Section three explains my sample selection and research design.  Section four discusses 
descriptive statistics and results while section five concludes.        
Background and Hypothesis Development       
Internal Revenue Code section 965, enacted as part of American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, was a temporary provision allowing U.S. multinational firms to repatriate 
earnings from their foreign subsidiaries at a reduced effective tax rate. Section 965 
provides that U.S. firms could elect, for one taxable year, an 85 percent dividends 
received deduction for eligible dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries, 
thereby establishing a maximum effective tax rate of 5.25 percent (i.e., 15 percent of 35 
percent) on qualifying dividends (U.S. Treasury Department 2005).  Firms could elect 
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the one-year holiday period as the last tax year beginning before the date of the 
enactment of AJCA (October 22, 2004) or the first taxable year beginning after that date.  
Therefore, all repatriated foreign earnings under the tax holiday were completed by 
October 2006.  The tax holiday provides a substantial benefit to multinational firms 
operating in low-tax countries.  The following sections will demonstrate the incentives 
created by the Act in greater detail. 
Under the U.S. international tax system, U.S. multinational corporations are 
generally required to record all incremental U.S. income taxes on foreign earnings in the 
current period.  Included in that amount are U.S. deferred taxes that will not be payable 
until the foreign earnings are repatriated as a dividend to the U.S. parent.  However, 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23) provides an exception to this 
rule.  Under APB 23, U.S. multinational corporations are not required to record deferred 
taxes on the foreign earnings if they are classified as permanently reinvested (PRE).  The 
PRE classification may be used by U.S. multinational corporations if the foreign 
earnings will be reinvested in the foreign subsidiary for an indefinite period of time.     
If the PRE classification is used for foreign earnings then the firm‟s foreign 
earnings are taxed in the foreign country when earned, and the firm is taxed on the 
foreign earnings by the U.S. government only upon repatriation.  To avoid double 
taxation on repatriated foreign earnings the U.S. tax laws permit a tax credit for foreign 
income taxes paid, but the foreign tax credit is limited to the U.S. tax liability.  Since the 
firm does not record U.S. taxes on the foreign earnings under the PRE classification, an 
incentive exists for firms to incur income in low-tax jurisdictions and classify them as 
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PRE in order to indefinitely avoid recording and paying the U.S. tax liability on those 
earnings.  Likewise under the PRE classification, the U.S. tax laws create a disincentive 
for firms to incur income in high-tax countries since the tax credits are capped at the 
U.S. tax liability. 
 For example, assume that a U.S. multinational firm operates a subsidiary in a 
low-tax country.  Assume that the firm has a U.S. corporate income tax rate of 35 
percent and a foreign tax rate of 10 percent in the low-tax country.  The foreign 
subsidiary earns $200 of income and decides to repatriate half of the earnings to the 
United States.  In the foreign country the subsidiary pays $20 to the foreign government 
on the $200 of foreign earnings.  The firm repatriates $100 to the United States and 
reinvests the remaining $100 in its foreign subsidiary.  The firm will pay $35 in U.S. 
taxes on the $100 repatriations, but it is eligible for a $10 tax credit for the foreign taxes 
paid.  In the following section I will demonstrate the lock-out effect created by the U.S. 
international tax system and suggests that the U.S. international tax system provides an 
incentive for firms operating in low-tax countries to defer recognition of U.S. taxes via 
the PRE designation.    
 Due to the fact that U.S. multinational firms, all else equal, recognize a U.S. tax 
liability that increases as the firm‟s foreign tax liability decreases, it is logical to assume 
that U.S. multinational firms will be more likely to designate their foreign earnings as 
permanently reinvested (PRE) as their foreign tax liability decreases.  By classifying 
their foreign earnings as PRE firms are able to indefinitely defer the recognition of the 
U.S. tax liability for earnings held in low-tax countries.  The deferral of the recognition 
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of the U.S. tax liability from low-tax countries via the PRE designation has been termed 
the “lock-out effect” of the U.S. international tax system.  It is argued that the lock-out 
effect is the direct result of the benefits generated from indefinitely deferring the 
repatriation of foreign earnings; because, absent such benefits, firms would have no 
incentive to postpone the repatriation of their foreign income since it would be taxed 
currently in the United States as earned (Clausing 2005). 
 Counter to the lock-out effect described above, Hartman (1985) assumes in 
developing his theoretical model that the U.S. taxation of income from low-tax countries 
is inevitable and that repatriation taxes will not influence the decision of when to 
repatriate the foreign earnings.  Hartman demonstrates that a dollar in repatriated 
earnings generates (1 minus the U.S. tax rate) divided by (1 minus the foreign tax rate) 
in cash flows for the parent firm.  For example, in the case of the $100 repatriated in the 
preceding example, the firm would have $100*(.65/.90), or $72, in cash after U.S. 
taxation. 
 In deciding between reinvesting foreign earnings abroad and repatriating, the 
firm will compare the after-tax return associated with each option.  If a firm reinvests its 
foreign earnings, it will eventually earn [(1 + r* (1 – foreign tax rate)) * ((1 - U.S. tax 
rate) / (1 minus the foreign tax rate))] where r* is the return in the foreign country and is 
taxed by the foreign government each period.  Eventually, the funds will be repatriated 
to the United States and incur an associated one time reduction in value. 
 Alternatively, if the foreign earnings are repatriated immediately instead the firm 
will earn [(1 + r) * ((1 - U.S. tax rate) / (1 minus the foreign tax rate))] where r is the net 
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return in the United States.  Comparing the two equations reveals that the level of U.S. 
taxation of foreign earnings will not affect the decision between foreign reinvestment 
and repatriation.  The U.S. tax costs associated with repatriations in the first equation is 
incurred regardless of whether one reinvests the earnings abroad or repatriates them.   
 Hartman‟s (1985) theoretical model suggest that a permanent reduction in the tax 
costs of repatriation would provided a windfall gain to investors, but it would not change 
the time path of repatriation flows from abroad, assuming of course that the economic 
actors in question view the change as completely permanent (Clausing 2005). 
Prior literature suggests that the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system does exist, and this stream of literature suggest that repatriations are very 
sensitive to the taxes that are due when foreign earnings are brought back to the United 
States.  Altshuler and Newlon (1993) evaluate tax return data and suggest that a 1 
percent higher repatriation tax burden is associated with a 1.5 percent reduction in 
repatriations.  Desai et al. (2001), using Bureau of Economic Analysis data from 1982 to 
1997, examine both affiliates that face U.S. repatriation taxes and branches that do not 
face U.S. repatriation taxes to help isolate the effect of taxes on repatriations.  They find 
that when branches face a 1 percent increase in repatriation taxes they decrease dividend 
repatriations by 1 percent, while branches do not exhibit this pattern.  Desai et al. (2001) 
conclude that repatriation taxes reduce dividend repatriations by approximately 13 
percent noting that “these effects would disappear if the U.S. were to exempt foreign 
income from taxation.”  Based on the preceding studies, I expect firms that repatriated 
under the tax holiday deferred repatriations and classified them as permanently 
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reinvested (PRE) prior to the passage of the Act to avoid recording the associated U.S. 
tax liability.  My first hypothesis stated in the alternative is: 
Hypothesis 1a: The level of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested 
(PRE) is positively associated with the repatriation tax cost prior to the tax holiday for 
firms repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.   
 
 Hartman‟s (1985) theoretical model, which was presented above, models the 
effect of the U.S. repatriation tax system on the decision to permanently reinvest foreign 
earnings abroad.  The alternative to reinvesting abroad is to pay the additional U.S. 
income tax due on the repatriation, and reinvest the after-U.S.-tax foreign earnings in the 
United States.  Hartman‟s solution is somewhat counterintuitive since it suggests that the 
length of the deferral of U.S. tax has no effect on the reinvestment decision.  Hartman‟s 
model shows that earnings should be reinvested in the location that provides the greatest 
expected after-local-tax rate of return, irrespective of the taxes owed upon repatriation to 
the United States. 
  Hartman‟s findings hold if foreign earnings are reinvested into operating assets, 
but Scholes et al. (2005) suggest that if the foreign income generated from operating 
assets is reinvested in financial assets, then the length of deferral of U.S. repatriation 
taxes does matter.  Therefore, foreign subsidiaries that have reached their optimal level 
of investment in operating assets may have an incentive to indefinitely defer repatriation 
to the U.S. in an effort to avoid recording a U.S. tax liability.  These firms will be likely 
to accumulate excessive amounts of financial assets, such as cash and marketable 
securities, in their foreign subsidiaries.  For example, a current working paper by Foley 
et al. (2007) suggest that firms‟ cash holdings are related to having foreign tax rates less 
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than U.S. tax rates.  The authors‟ findings suggest that a positive relationship exists 
between the amount of cash holdings in their foreign subsidiaries and the U.S. tax 
liability associated with the foreign earnings.  The authors‟ findings suggest that 
subsidiaries that trigger higher U.S. tax liabilities upon the recognition of their foreign 
earnings hold higher levels of cash than other subsidiaries of the same firm.   
 My next hypothesis is loosely motivated by the theoretical model developed in 
De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) which portrays a firm‟s optimal repatriation and 
investment decisions under the U.S. international tax system.  The authors‟ model 
suggests that firms operating in low-tax countries and that have reached their optimal 
level of investment in foreign operating assets are more likely to designate their foreign 
earnings as PRE and hold these earnings in the foreign subsidiary as financial assets.  To 
motivate my hypothesis, I will provide a simple numerical example based on De 
Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) model.  Although the following example is simplified, 
it may be generalized and provides a good intuitive explanation for my hypothesis. 
 The following numerical example is borrowed from Bryant-Kutchner et al. 
(2007) and demonstrates why firms operating in low-tax countries are more likely to 
hold foreign assets in financial assets prior to repatriating under a tax holiday.  Assume 
that a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. multinational invests an amount, K, in foreign 
operating assets generating pre-tax cash flows (and earnings) according to the function 
f(K) = 0.20(K) – 0.001(K2), so that increased investment results in increased earnings, 
but at a decreasing rate.  Assume that the firm has an after-tax discount rate equal to 4 
percent, that the U.S. corporate tax rate is 35 percent, and that the after-U.S.- tax risk-
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free rate is 3.25 percent, which implies a pretax risk-free rate of 5 percent.  The firm 
faces a foreign tax rate, τF, that is less than the 35 percent U.S. tax rate.  
 In the preceding example the firm should continue to reinvest in foreign 
operating assets until the optimal investment level, K*, is reached, where (1 - τF)f '(K*) 
= 4 percent.  That is, the firm should keep investing in foreign operating assets until the 
marginal after-foreign-tax return on additional investment is equal to the firm‟s discount 
rate. 
 Further for this example, assume two firms, H and L, are operating in two foreign 
countries with different tax rates.  Country H has a tax rate of 25 percent and country L 
has a tax rate of 15 percent.  Based on the preceding foreign tax rates and the fact that f 
'(K) = 0.20 – 2(0.001)K, firm H will continue to reinvest in foreign operating assets until 
K=73, since (1 – 25%) f '(73) = 4%, firm H‟s discount rate.  Operating assets equal to 73 
will generate a before-tax return each year of f(73) = 0.20(73) – 0.001(732) = 9.27.  On 
the other hand, firm L will continue to reinvest in foreign operating assets until K = 76, 
since (1 – 15%) f '(76) = 4%, firm L‟s discount rate.  Operating assets equal to 76 will 
generate a before-tax return each year of f(76) = 0.20(76) – 0.001(762) = 9.42. 
 De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) study the optimal repatriation strategy for a 
firm that has reached investment level K* and will therefore stop investing future foreign 
earnings in foreign operating assets.  I assume firms that repatriated under the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 are firms that have reached investment level K*; otherwise, 
they would have continued to reinvest their foreign earnings into foreign operating 
assets.  Firms that have reached K* face two choices: the firm could either begin to 
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repatriate all future earnings as a taxable dividend to the U.S. parent incurring the 35 
percent U.S. tax rate, or it can reinvest the after-foreign-tax earnings in foreign financial 
assets that earn the risk free rate until it repatriates all of its foreign earnings as a taxable 
dividend to the U.S. parent.    
 De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) suggest that the optimal repatriation strategy 
depends on the relative size of (1) the after-foreign-tax risk-free rate, and (2) the firm‟s 
discount rate.  Let R equal the risk-free-rate and r equal the firm‟s discount rate.  The 
repatriation decision depends on the relative size of r and R(1 - τF).  If the discount rate 
is greater than the after-foreign-tax risk free rate, so that r > R(1 - τF), the optimal 
decision is to repatriate all future earnings as a taxable dividend to the parent and to 
incur the 35 percent U.S. tax rate.  Using the sample firms, assume that firm H, with a 
foreign tax rate of 25 percent, generates $20 of pretax foreign earnings, resulting in $15 
of after-tax earnings.  Repatriations yield $13 after U.S. tax to the U.S. parent.  Since the 
firm has reached its optimal level of investment in operating assets, if it retains the $15 
abroad, it can only reinvest at the 3.25 percent after-U.S.-tax risk-free rate.  This 
investment yields a perpetuity of 0.49 with a present value of 0.49/0.04 = $12.19, which 
is less than $13.  Thus the optimal policy for firm H is to repatriate all future earnings 
from foreign operating assets as a taxable dividend to the U.S. parent. 
 If the discount rate is less than the after-foreign-tax risk free rate, so that r < R(1 - 
τF), firm value is maximized if the foreign earnings are not repatriated and are instead 
held abroad in foreign financial assets.  This is the optimal decision despite the fact that 
the future earnings from the foreign financial assets will be subject to tax at the 35 
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percent U.S. tax rate.  Using my example firms, assume that firm L, with a foreign tax 
rate of 15 percent, generates $20 of pretax foreign earnings, resulting in $17 of after-tax 
earnings.  Repatriation yields $13 after U.S. tax to the U.S. parent.  Retaining the $17 
abroad and reinvesting at the 3.25 percent after-U.S. tax risk-free rate yields a perpetuity 
of 0.55 with a present value of 0.55/0.04 = $13.81, which is more than $13.  Therefore, 
the optimal policy for firm L is to reinvest all future earnings from foreign operating 
assets in foreign financial assets, and to not repatriate the foreign operating earnings 
until a tax holiday is granted for repatriations by the United States.   
 Based on the preceding examples, firms will reinvest foreign earnings into 
foreign operations until they reach their optimal level of investment in foreign 
operations, K*.  All else equal, only after reaching K* will firms begin to accumulate 
foreign earnings in financial assets as a result of the taxes due upon repatriation to the 
United States.   Therefore, as implied by the theoretical model from De Waegenaere and 
Sansing (2006) and the empirical findings of Foley et al. (2006), I predict that the 
following hypothesis stated in the alternative form will hold: 
Hypothesis 1b: The level of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested is 
positively associated with the level of cash holdings prior to the tax holiday for firms 
repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.   
 
Hartman‟s (1985) theoretical model assumes that the tax costs of repatriations do 
not change over time, but his model does not consider a temporary change in the tax 
costs of repatriations.  Therefore, the temporary change in the tax costs of repatriations 
under the provisions of the AJCA (i.e., the tax costs of repatriations is reduced for one-
year by 85%) removes Hartman‟s assumption that the tax costs of repatriations do not 
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change over time.  Under the tax holiday provided by the Act equations (2) and (3) in 
Hartman‟s model, presented above, will no longer drop out (Clausing 2005).  Therefore, 
the tax holiday provides a unique opportunity to investigate the lock-out effect of the 
U.S. international tax system. 
As demonstrated by Hartman (1985), if the dividend tax holiday under the Act 
was unexpected then it would not have affected firms‟ repatriations decision prior to the 
tax holiday.  Interestingly, even if the tax holiday provided by the Act was anticipated, 
as some have argued, this would have generated a reduced incentive to repatriate foreign 
earnings in years prior to the tax holiday as well (Clausing 2005).  Therefore, regardless 
if the tax holiday was anticipated or not, firms experiencing the lock-out effect of the 
U.S. international tax system have an incentive to repatriate more funds during the tax 
holiday than they would prior to or after the one-time tax holiday.  Therefore, I expect 
the following hypothesis stated in the alternative form to hold: 
Hypothesis 2a: The change in foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested is 
positively associated with the change in repatriation tax cost in the year of the tax 
holiday for firms repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.   
 
Under Hartman‟s (1985) assumptions in his theoretical model no lock-out effect 
would exist.  But, the theoretical model of De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006), 
presented above, demonstrates that firms that have reached their optimal level of 
investment in foreign operating assets, K*, may accumulate foreign financial assets in 
their subsidiaries to avoid recording U.S. repatriation taxes.   
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De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) also model firms‟ behavior around tax 
holidays that occur in a stochastic fashion.  The authors argue that because operating 
assets are costly to liquidate, all repatriations under a tax holiday must be in the form of 
financial assets.  The authors‟ argument is consistent with Slemrod‟s (1992) tax planning 
hierarchy in which most tax planning activities involve accounting and financial 
transactions instead of transactions involving real investment decisions. 
De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) demonstrate that firms experiencing the 
lock-out effect will accumulate financial assets in their low-tax foreign subsidiaries to 
avoid paying U.S. repatriation taxes.  Furthermore, the authors argue that only firms that 
have accumulated financial assets will have the cash required to repatriate significant 
amounts of foreign earnings that have accumulated abroad due to the lock-effect of the 
U.S. international tax system.  In summary, only firms that have accumulated financial 
assets due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system will have the ability 
to repatriate significant amounts of foreign earnings under the one-time tax holiday.  
Based on De Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) predictions, I expect the following 
hypothesis stated in the alternative form to hold:   
Hypothesis 2b: The change in foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested is 
positively associated with the change in cash holdings in the year of the tax holiday for 
firms repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.   
  
In the year following the tax holiday, I expect that the lock-out effect will be 
reestablished primarily due to the fact that the tax costs for repatriations increases back 
to the price paid prior to the holiday.  Furthermore, similar to tax amnesties, firms are 
now likely to have increased expectations of future tax holidays.  As stated in Clausing 
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(2005), this expectation will exists because to the extent that firms come to anticipate 
future tax holidays, they will no longer view the regular tax rate as the permanent one, 
and firms may thus defer future repatriations in the hope of similar tax holidays in the 
future.  In fact, some have suggested that the tax holiday represents an initial step toward 
the exemption of foreign income.  If firms anticipate such a transition, they may be 
particularly reluctant to incur the normal tax costs of repatriations (Clausing 2005).   
Therefore, I expect the following hypothesis stated in the alternative form to hold: 
Hypothesis 3a: The change in foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested is 
positively associated with the change in repatriation tax cost in the year following the tax 
holiday for firms repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.   
  
De Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) demonstrate that firms that repatriated under 
the tax holiday provided by the Act accumulated financial assets in their low-tax foreign 
subsidiaries prior to repatriation.  The authors then suggest that, “because at a tax 
holiday accumulated financial assets can be repatriated at the lower repatriation tax rate, 
the expectation of a future tax holiday may affect the firms‟ decision whether to reinvest 
its foreign earnings from operating assets in financial assets or to repatriate them as a 
dividend.”  Consistent with the authors‟ prediction, I expect that firms experiencing the 
lock-effect of the U.S. international tax system will now have an increased incentive to 
defer the repatriation of financial assets due to the fact that the one-time tax holiday will 
have likely increased expectations of tax holidays reoccurring in the future.  Therefore, I 
expect that the following hypothesis stated in the alternative form will hold: 
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Hypothesis 3b: The change in foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested is 
positively associated with the change in cash holdings in the year following the tax 
holiday for firms repatriating under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.   
 
Sample Selection and Research Design 
 I hand collect annual financial statement data for a sample of U.S. multinational 
firms that repatriated under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  I 
identified these firms through two primary sources.  First, I identified firms that 
disclosed they repatriated under the Act in their financial statements by searching the 
EDGAR database utilizing the following search string [(10Q or 10K) and (foreign 
earnings repatriation) w/25 (American Jobs Creation Act of 2004)].  Second, I identified 
firms that repatriated under the Act using the Lexis-Nexis Business Wire and News Wire 
and Google searches using the following key words “foreign earnings repatriation” and 
“American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”.  The combined results of these searches 
confirmed 364 firms that repatriated under the provisions of the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004. 
For the sample of firms repatriating under the provisions of the Act, I also collect 
permanently reinvested data (PRE) from fiscal years 2004 through 2006.  PRE is my 
proxy for the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Specifically, firms 
repatriating under the one-time tax holiday designated foreign earnings as PRE to avoid 
recording the associated U.S. tax liability for these earnings.  My study focuses on fiscal 
years 2004 through 2006 because they are the years surrounding the year in which the 
firms repatriated permanently reinvested earnings under the provisions of the one-time 
tax holiday.  Thus, fiscal years 2004 through 2006 provide a representative window to 
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evaluate how firms changed their lock-out behavior (i.e., level of PRE) around the one-
time tax holiday provided by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.   
 I impose several restrictions on my sample before conducting my empirical tests.  
For each observation, I search the income tax footnote for disclosures of PRE.  I exclude 
observations that do not disclose an amount for PRE and observations that do not 
include prior year PRE needed to compute my ΔPRE variable.  To help assure that the 
PRE designation captures the lock-out effect, I also delete firms that recorded a tax 
benefit for the earnings repatriated under the one-time tax holiday.  These firms are 
deleted because the recording of a tax benefit upon repatriation under the tax holiday 
indicates that a tax liability had previously been recorded for at least some of the foreign 
earnings repatriated under the provisions of the Act.  Finally, firm-year observations 
must have sufficient data for hypothesis testing. 
 Based on the data requirements, I identify 188 firms that have the required data 
to conduct my test of H1a and H1b in fiscal year 2004, 184 firms to conduct my test H2a 
and H2b in fiscal year 2005, and 132 firms to conduct my test of H3a and H3b in fiscal 
year 2006.   
 I test H1a and H1b using the following ordinary least squares regression model to 
measure PRE and its determinants in the year prior to the one-year tax holiday: 
(III.1) PRE =  β 1 Size + β2 Foreign Income + β3 U.S. Income + β 4 Capex  
+ β5 Research & Development + β6 Book-to-market + β 7 Cash holdings  
+ β 8 Repatriation tax + β 9 Share Repurchases + ε     
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where PRE equals the level of permanently reinvested earnings scaled by total assets in 
the year prior to repatriation under the one-time tax holiday.  The value of PRE is hand-
collected from the firms‟ financial statement footnotes, and total assets are obtained from 
the Compustat annual database (Data 6).  The dependent variable in equation (III.1) is 
my proxy for the level of foreign earnings held abroad due to the lock-out effect of the 
U.S. international tax system. 
 To investigate whether the magnitude of PRE prior to repatriation under the one-
time tax holiday is associated with the unrecognized U.S. tax liability, I calculate the 
Repatriation tax variable which proxies for the U.S. tax liability associated with the 
earnings classified as PRE.  I obtain footnote disclosures that provide both the U.S. tax 
liability recorded under the tax holiday and the corresponding amount of foreign 
earnings repatriated under the tax holiday.  Under the tax holiday firms receive an 85% 
reduction in the U.S. tax liability associated with the repatriations brought back.  
Therefore, the U.S. tax rate associated with the repatriations under the tax holiday is 
equal to the recognized (discounted) U.S. tax liability divided by the foreign earnings 
repatriated under the provisions of the Act.  For example if a firm recorded a U.S. tax 
liability of $5.25 associated with the repatriation of $100 under the Act, the firms 
Repatriation tax rate under the tax holiday would equal 5.25 percent (i.e., 15 percent of 
the non-holiday U.S. tax liability); so, in years other than the tax holiday the firm would 
have recognized a Repatriation tax rate on the foreign earnings equal to 35 percent (i.e., 
5.25 percent divided by 15 percent).  H1a predicts that the level of foreign earnings 
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designated as PRE is positively associated with the Repatriation tax rate prior to the tax 
holiday.  Thus, I expect a positive and significant coefficient on Repatriation tax rate. 
 H1b predicts that the magnitude of foreign earnings designated as permanently 
reinvested is positively associated with the level of cash holdings prior to the tax 
holiday.  To identify whether the magnitude of PRE is positively associated with cash 
holdings, I calculate the cash holdings ratio following Foley et al. (2006).  The cash 
holdings ratio is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to net assets (defined as total 
assets minus cash).  Using Compustat annual data the cash holdings ratio, Ln(Cash/Net 
Assets), is calculated as the natural log of (data item 1 / (data item 6 – data item 1)).  H1b 
predicts the magnitude of foreign earnings designated as PRE is positively associated 
with the cash holdings ratio prior to the tax holiday.  Thus, I expect a positive and 
significant coefficient on the cash holdings ratio. 
 In addition to my variables of interest model one includes the following control 
variables.  Size which is equal to the log of total assets (data item 6) controls for 
unspecified size effects in the model.  Foreign Income which is equal to pretax foreign 
income scaled by total assets (data item 273 / data item 6) and, U.S. Income which is 
equal to U.S. pretax income scaled by total assets (data item 272 / data item 6) are 
included to control for the effects of foreign and domestic profitability on PRE.  Capex 
is equal to capital expenditures scaled by total assets (data item 128 / data item 6) and is 
included in the model to as a proxy to control for historical growth.  Research & 
Development is equal to R&D expense scaled by total assets (data item 46 / data item 6) 
and is included as a control variable that proxies for future growth.  Book-to-market is 
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equal to book value scaled by market value of equity (data item 60 / (data199*data25) 
and is also included in the model to control for a firm‟s growth opportunities.  Finally, 
share repurchases, ((data item 115 – (data item 130 – data item 175)) / data item 6), is 
included based on prior research (Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 2006) to 
evaluate how a firm‟s payout behavior changes around the one-time tax holiday. 
 I test H2a and H2b using the following ordinary least squares regression model to 
measure the change in PRE and the change in the determinants of PRE in the year of the 
one-year tax holiday: 
(III.2) ΔPRE  =  β 1 Size + β2 ΔForeign income + β3 ΔU.S.income + β 4 ΔCapex +  
β5 ΔResearch & Development  + β6 Book-to-market + β 7 ΔCash holdings +  
β 8 ΔRepatriation tax + β 9 ΔShare Repurchases +  εi   
 
where the ΔPRE equals the change in permanently reinvested earnings from the year 
prior to the tax holiday (t – 1) to the year of the tax holiday year (t) scaled by total assets.  
The values of PRE are hand-collected from the firms‟ financial statement footnotes, and 
total assets are obtained from the Compustat annual database (Data 6).  The dependent 
variable in equation (III.2) measures the change in PRE in the year of the tax holiday 
associated with a reduction in the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system. 
 I investigate whether the change in PRE is associated with the 85% reduction in 
the U.S. tax liability on such earnings in the year of the tax holiday.  I calculate the 
ΔRepatriation tax variable from the year prior to the tax holiday (t – 1) to the year of the 
tax holiday year (t) scaled by total assets to proxy for the reduction in the U.S. tax 
liability due to the tax holiday.  Based on financial statement footnote disclosures, I 
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obtain both the U.S. tax liability recognized under the tax holiday and the corresponding 
amount of foreign earnings repatriated under the tax holiday.  The U.S. tax liability 
recognized by firms repatriating under the tax holiday is 15% (i.e., an 85% reduction 
under the Act) of the U.S. tax liability that would have been recorded by the firms absent 
the tax holiday. Since the U.S. tax liability recognized under the holiday represents 15 
percent of the U.S. tax liability, I proxy for the U.S. tax liability years other than the tax 
holiday by dividing the recognized U.S. tax liability under the tax holiday by 15 percent. 
Therefore, the ΔRepatriation tax represents the tax savings in the year of repatriation 
under the tax holiday.  H2a predicts that the change in PRE is positively associated with 
the change in repatriation tax in the year of the tax holiday for firms repatriating under 
the Act.  Therefore, I expect a positive and significant coefficient on the ΔRepatriation 
tax variable in the year of repatriation.   
 I also investigate whether the change in PRE is associated with the ΔCash 
holdings in the year of the tax holiday.  I calculate the ΔCash holdings variable from the 
year prior to the tax holiday (t – 1) to the year of the tax holiday year (t) scaled by total 
assets to proxy for the reduction in the cash holdings associated with the one-time tax 
holiday.  H2b predicts that the ΔPRE is positively associated with the ΔCash holdings in 
the year in which permanently reinvested earnings are repatriated under the tax holiday.  
Thus, I expect a positive and significant coefficient on the ΔCash holdings.  Finally, I 
expect that the ΔPRE is negatively associated with the ΔShare Repurchases.  This result 
would be consistent with prior research (Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 
  
62 
6
2
 
2006) that suggest that firms repatriating under the tax holiday used the funds to increase 
distributions to share holders in the year of the tax holiday. 
   In addition to my variables of interest model 2 includes the following control 
variables.  Size which controls for unspecified size effects.  ΔForeign Income and ΔU.S. 
Income are included to control for the effects of the changes in foreign and domestic 
profitability.  ΔCapex, ΔResearch & Development, and Book-to-market are included in 
the model to control for a firm‟s growth opportunities.   
 I test H3a and H3b using the following ordinary least squares regression model to 
measure the change in PRE and the change in the determinants of PRE in the year 
following the one-year tax holiday: 
 
(III.3) ΔPRE  =  β 1 Size + β2 ΔForeign income + β3 ΔU.S.income + β 4 ΔCapex  
+ β5 ΔResearch & Development  + β6 Book-to-market + β 7 ΔCash holdings  
+ β 8 ΔRepatriation tax + β 9 ΔShare Repurchases + ε    
  
where the ΔPRE equals the change in permanently reinvested earnings from the year of 
the tax holiday (t) to the year following the tax holiday (t + 1) scaled by total assets.  The 
dependent variable in equation (3) measures the ΔPRE in the year following the tax 
holiday to examine if it is associated with an increase in the lock-out effect of the U.S. 
international tax system.  Specifically, the U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings returns 
to its original costs for firms repatriating under the one-time tax holiday, and I expect 
firms to once again repeat their lock-out behavior. 
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 I investigate whether the change in PRE is associated with the 85% increase in 
the U.S. tax liability on such earnings in the year following the tax holiday.  I calculate 
the ΔRepatriation tax variable from the year of the tax holiday (t) to the year following 
the one-time tax holiday (t + 1) scaled by total assets to proxy for the increase in the U.S. 
tax liability after the tax holiday.  The U.S. tax liability recognized by firms repatriating 
under the tax holiday is 15% (i.e., an 85% reduction under the Act) of the U.S. tax 
liability that would have been recorded by the firms absent the tax holiday. Since the 
U.S. tax liability recognized under the holiday represents 15 percent of the U.S. tax 
liability, I proxy for the U.S. tax liability years other than the tax holiday by dividing the 
recognized U.S. tax liability under the tax holiday by 15 percent. Therefore, the 
ΔRepatriation tax represents the U.S. tax liability increase in the year following 
repatriation under the tax holiday.  H3a predicts that the change in PRE is positively 
associated with the change in repatriation tax in the year following the tax holiday for 
firms repatriating under the Act.  Therefore, I expect a positive and significant 
coefficient on the ΔRepatriation tax variable in the year following repatriation under the 
one-time tax holiday.   
 I also investigate whether the change in PRE is associated with the ΔCash 
holdings in the year following the tax holiday.  I calculate the ΔCash holdings variable 
from the year of the tax holiday (t) to the year following the tax holiday (t + 1) scaled by 
total assets to proxy for the increase in the cash holdings associated with the expiration 
of the one-time tax holiday.  H3b predicts that the ΔPRE is positively associated with the 
ΔCash holdings in the year following the year in which permanently reinvested earnings 
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were repatriated under the tax holiday.  Thus, I expect a positive and significant 
coefficient on the ΔCash holdings.  Finally, I expect that the ΔPRE is negatively 
associated with the ΔShare Repurchases.  This result would add support to prior research 
(Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 2006) that suggest that firms repatriating 
under the tax holiday used the funds to increase distributions to share holders following 
the one-year tax holiday.  In addition to my variables of interest, model (III.3) includes 
the same control variables as model (III.2) to control for size effects, and growth factors.   
Descriptive Statistics and Results 
 I identified 188 firms that deferred the repatriation of their foreign earnings due 
to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Table III-1 summarizes the 
industry composition of my sample firms that repatriated under the one-time tax holiday 
provided by the Act.  Approximately half of the sample firms are in manufacturing 
industries and represent 49 percent of the repatriating firms.  Service companies 
comprise the second largest group of repatriating firms (8 percent of the sample), and 
retail companies and financial service companies are the third largest group of 
repatriating firms (each represent 5 percent of the sample).  
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Table III-1.  Industry Distribution of Firms Repatriating under the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 
 
 
 
Industry distribution of firms repatriating under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
 
 
SIC Code                    # of Firms: 
 
1000-1999 Mining and Construction      4 
2000-2999 Manufacturing       46 
3000-3999 Manufacturing       94 
4000-4999 Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas   5 
5000-5999 Wholesale, Retail       10 
6000-6999 Financial, Insurance, Real Estate     10 
7000-7999 Hotel, Services       15 
8000-8999 Services        3 
9000-9999 Public Administration       1 
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Table III-2 presents data for the sample of firms that deferred repatriation due to 
the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Statistics reported in Table III-2 
are based only on those firms that have sufficient data available to calculate each 
specific metric.  I do not winsorize or otherwise transform the raw data reported in Table 
III-2; hence, some means are heavily influenced by outliers.  I provide minimum and 
maximum values as well as the standard error for each variable for the repatriating firms 
so that the influence of outliers can be inferred.   
For the 188 firms, the per-firm average amount repatriated under the Act was 
approximately $1 billion, and the average repatriation equaled 9 percent of total assets.  
The median repatriation amount was $130 million and equaled 6 percent of total assets.  
The sample firms were large and had substantial foreign operations.  Average total assets 
were $15.7 billion, and foreign income accounted for 5 percent of the firm‟s total assets.   
The data in Table III-2 demonstrates that the average tax savings for firms 
repatriating under the Act was significant.  On average, the sample firms had a U.S.  
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effective tax rate of 32 percent and a foreign tax rate for repatriated earnings of 6 
percent.  Absent the one-time tax holiday, firms would have recognized a U.S. tax 
liability of approximately $266 million on the foreign earnings (i.e., (.32 - .06)*1,022), 
but under the one-time tax holiday the liability represented 15 percent of this amount 
($40 million) representing a U.S. tax savings of $226 million for firms repatriating under 
the provisions of the Act.  Consistent with prior research (De Waegenaere and Sansing 
2006; Foley et al. 2006), the data in Table III-2 suggests that firms were retaining their 
foreign earnings abroad in cash due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system.  Based on the median value, cash holdings for the sample firms equaled 13 
percent of net assets (net assets = total assets – cash).  Finally, on average research and 
development expense represented 4 percent of total assets, and the average book-to-
market ratio was .40.  The evidence presented in Table III-2 provides preliminary data to 
support my expectations.  Next, I will present the results of my empirical analysis. 
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Table III-2.  2004 Descriptive Statistics for Firms Repatriating under the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Repatriations
Repatriations 1,022 3,385 1 130 37,000
Repatriations / total assets 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.55
Permanently reinvested earnings (PRE)
PRE 1,746 4,870 4 337 51,600
PRE / total assets 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.73
Tax attributes
Effective tax rate (ETR) 0.32 0.81 -1.92 0.30 10.50
Foreign tax rate (FTR) 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.35
Firm characteristics
Size (total assets) 15,656 58,451 84 3,016 648,059
Foreign income / total assets 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.17
Research and Development / total assets 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.15
Book-to-market ratio 0.40 0.22 0.01 0.37 1.16
Cash holdings (cash / net assets) 0.28 0.49 0.00 0.13 3.32
($ amounts in millions)
TABLE 2
2004 Descriptive statistics
Firms repatriating under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
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Table III-3 presents the results from model III.1 which tests the association between the 
level of PRE and its explanatory variables in the year prior to repatriation.   
Consistent with H1a, I find a positive and significant association between the 
level of PRE and the repatriation tax liability that would have been recorded if the 
foreign earnings were not classified as PRE (p-value 0.00, one-tailed test).  This result 
suggests that as a firm‟s U.S. tax liability recognizable for foreign earnings increases so 
does the likelihood that the firm will classify the foreign earnings as permanently 
reinvested to avoid recording the U.S. tax liability.  The evidence obtained in H1a 
suggests that the lock-effect of the U.S. international tax system motivated firms to delay 
the repatriation of their foreign earnings prior to the one-time tax holiday. 
 Consistent with H1b, I find a positive and significant association between the 
level of PRE and the level of cash holdings in the year prior to repatriation under the tax 
holiday (p-value 0.00, one-tailed test).  This result provides additional evidence to 
suggest that firms were experiencing the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system prior to the one-year tax holiday.  Specifically, this result suggest that firms were  
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not only deferring the repatriation to avoid the recognizing the U.S. tax liability but they 
were also holding these earnings in cash rather than reinvesting them in foreign 
operations.  This finding is consistent with the predictions of De Waegenaere and 
Sansing (2006).  The authors predict that firms repatriating under the one-year tax 
holiday would have accumulated excess cash in their foreign subsidiaries due to the U.S. 
tax liability that would be required upon repatriation. 
 Not surprisingly, I also find that the level of Foreign Income is significantly and 
positively associated with the level of PRE (p-value 0.00, two-tailed test), and the level 
of U.S. Income is significantly and negatively associated with the level of PRE (p-value 
0.01, 2-tailed test).  These results indicate that firms generating relatively higher levels 
of foreign income have a greater capacity to permanently reinvest their foreign earnings 
abroad. 
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Table III-3.  OLS Regression of PRE for Firms Repatriations under the Tax 
Holiday on Motives for PRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted
Variables Sign Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Intercept ? 0.192 *** 3.28 0.00
Size ? -0.007 -1.36 0.18
Foreign Income ? 1.864 *** 7.02 0.00
U.S. Income ? -0.462 *** -2.55 0.01
Capex ? 0.078 0.28 0.78
Reasearch & Development ? -0.151 -0.62 0.54
Book-to-market ? 0.007 0.14 0.89
Cash holdings + 0.033 *** 4.04 0.00
Repatriation tax + 0.183 *** 2.66 0.00
Repurchases ? 0.062 0.36 0.72
Adjusted R-square = 40%
TABLE 3
OLS regression of permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) for
firms repatriations under the tax holiday on motives for PRE
*** indicates significance at the 5 percent level or better for a one-tailed test when a 
prediction is made and a two-tailed test when no prediction is made
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 Table III-4 presents the results from model III.2 which tests the association 
between the change in PRE and the change in the explanatory variables in the year of 
repatriation.   
Consistent with H2a, I find a positive and significant association between the 
change in PRE and the change in repatriation tax liability due to the one-time tax 
holiday (p-value 0.00, one-tailed test).  This result suggests that firm‟s repatriated under 
the Act to reap the tax savings for repatriations provided by the one-year tax holiday.   
The evidence obtained in H2a provides a natural setting to demonstrate that, all else 
equal, firms experiencing the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system will 
repatriate their earnings when the tax burden for repatriations is significantly reduced.     
Consistent with H2b, I find a positive and significant association between the 
change in PRE and the change in cash holdings in the year of repatriation under the one-
year tax holiday (p-value 0.02, one-tailed test).  Consistent with the predictions of De 
Waegenaere and Sansing (2006), this finding suggests that firms released the excess cash 
from their foreign subsidiaries under the one-year tax holiday that was previously 
accumulated to avoid the U.S. tax liability associated with the foreign earnings.   
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Combined H2a and H2b suggest that firms repatriating under the Act had accumulated 
permanently reinvested foreign earnings to avoid recognizing the U.S. tax liability that 
would have been required (i.e., the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system).  
Also, prior research (Blouin and Krull 2006; Clemons and Kinney 2006) suggests that 
firms that repatriated funds under the one-time tax holiday utilized the cash to increase 
share repurchases; therefore, I expect that the change in PRE will be negatively 
associated with the change in share repurchases in the year of repatriation under the 
one-year tax holiday.  Consistent with my prediction, I find a negative and significant 
association between the change in PRE and the change in share repurchases in the year 
of repatriation (p-value 0.01, one-tailed test).      
 In addition to my variables of interest, additional independent variables are 
significantly associated with the change in PRE in the year of the one-time tax holiday.  
First, the change in research and development is positively and significantly associated 
with the change in PRE in the year of the tax holiday.  One possible explanation for this 
result is that firms curtailed their R&D to help generate the cash required to fund the 
repatriations.  The book-to-market ratio was also positively and significantly associated 
with the change in PRE in the year of the tax holiday.   
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Table III-4.  OLS Regression of 2004 to 2005 Changes in PRE for Firms 
Repatriating under the Tax Holiday on Changes in Motives for PRE 
 
  
Predicted
Variables Sign Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Intercept ? -0.094 *** -2.49 0.01
Size ? 0.004 0.96 0.34
Book-to-market ratio ? 0.063 *** 2.23 0.03
Change in foreign Income ? 0.291 0.97 0.33
Change in U.S. Income ? 0.327 1.78 0.08
Change in capex ? 0.271 0.66 0.51
Change in reasearch & development ? 1.169 *** 2.46 0.01
Change in cash holdings + 0.017 *** 2.11 0.02
Change in repatriation tax + 0.189 *** 6.11 0.00
Change in share repurchases - -0.197 *** -2.53 0.01
Adjusted R-square = 24%
TABLE 4
OLS regression of 2004 to 2005 changes in permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) for
firms repatriating under the tax holiday on changes in the motives for PRE
*** indicates significance at the 5 percent level or better for a one-tail test when a prediction is made 
and a two-tailed test when no prediction is made.
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 Table III-5 presents the results from model III.3 which tests the association 
between the change in PRE and the change in the explanatory variables in the year 
following repatriation under the one-time tax holiday.    
Consistent with H3a, I find a positive and significant association between the 
change in PRE and the change in repatriation tax liability due to the one-time tax 
holiday (p-value 0.01, one-tailed test).  Consistent with the predictions of prior research 
(Clausing 2005, Gravelle 2005, De Waegenaere and Sansing 2006) this result suggests 
that the one-time tax holiday would encourage firms to once again retain foreign 
earnings abroad due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  
Specifically, not only do these firms once again benefit from not recognizing a U.S. tax 
liability on the foreign earnings, but the firms also have an added incentive (i.e., they 
now have reason to expect additional tax holidays in the future).       
 Contrary to H3b, the coefficient on the change in cash holdings in the year 
following repatriation is not significantly different from zero (p-value 0.08, one-tailed 
test).  This result suggests that the firms who increased their level of PRE in the year 
following the Act did not retain the foreign earnings as cash.  Although unexpected, this  
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result may be due to the fact that my proxy for cash holdings includes both foreign and 
U.S. cash holdings; therefore, even if firms increased foreign cash holdings as expected 
in their foreign subsidiaries, offsetting outflows from the U.S. parent would have 
countered the increase.  For example, to reduce agency costs resulting from the large 
amounts of cash repatriated under the tax holiday, firms may have continued distributing 
cash to shareholders via the firms‟ more ambitious share repurchase plans that were 
established in the year of repatriation.  Since cash holdings equals total cash holdings 
(both U.S. and foreign) increases in foreign cash holdings may have been at least 
partially offset by decreases in U.S. cash holdings to continue to fund share repurchases.  
In support of this argument, I find a negative and significant coefficient on change in 
share repurchases (p-value 0.03, one-tailed test).  This result suggest that firms that 
continued to significantly increase their distributions to shareholders via share 
repurchases were less likely to significantly increase their level of PRE in the year 
following the one-time tax holiday.  In future years, it is my expectation that this sub-
sample of firms will also significantly increase their levels of PRE in a manner 
consistent with the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system. 
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Table III-5.  OLS Regression of 2005 to 2006 Changes in PRE for Firms 
Repatriating under the Tax Holiday on Changes in the Motives for PRE 
 
 
Predicted 
Variables Sign Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Intercept ? 0.042 *** 2.13 0.03
Size ? -0.003 -1.43 0.16
Book-to-market ratio ? -0.013 -1.64 0.10
Change in foreign Income ? 0.453 *** 2.77 0.00
Change in U.S. Income ? -0.005 -0.05 0.96
Change in capex ? 0.343 1.83 0.07
Change in reasearch & development ? -0.017 -0.07 0.94
Change in cash holdings + -0.007 -1.38 0.08
Change in repatriation tax + 0.083 *** 2.60 0.01
Change in share repurchases - -0.082 *** -1.96 0.03
Adjusted R-square = 15%
TABLE 5
OLS regression of 2005 to 2006 changes in permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) for
firms repatriating under the tax holiday on changes in the motives for PRE
*** indicates significance at the 5 percent level or better for a one-tail test when a 
prediction is made and a two-tailed test when no prediction is made.
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Summary 
 
 This study addresses the following research question: do U.S. multinational firms 
classify foreign earnings as permanently reinvested (PRE) to avoid recognizing the 
associated U.S. tax liability?  If firms classify earning as permanently reinvested with the 
objective of reinvesting them in foreign operations then the firms would have utilized the 
classification for its intended purposes.  On the other hand, firms may also have no 
intentions of reinvesting the foreign earnings classified as PRE.  These firms classify the 
earnings as such specifically to receive the financial and tax benefits resulting from the 
PRE classification.  For example, by classifying the foreign earnings as PRE firms 
reduce their tax expense owed to the IRS and also increase their financial statement 
income by the unrecognized U.S. tax liability.  Classifying foreign earnings as PRE to 
avoid recording the U.S. tax liability has been termed the “lock-out” effect of the U.S. 
international tax system.     
 Prior research suggests that some firms classified their foreign earnings as PRE 
due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Krull (2004) finds that 
firms use the PRE designation to opportunistically manage their earnings.  De 
Waegenaere and Sansing (2006) demonstrate in their theoretical model that some firms 
accumulate foreign earnings stored as cash to avoid recognizing the U.S. tax liability on 
the foreign earnings.  In studying why firms hold excess cash, Foley et al. (2007) find 
that firms accumulate excess cash in their foreign subsidiaries as the recognizable U.S. 
tax liability increases.  Motivated by this stream of research, I evaluate the lock-out 
effect of the U.S. international tax system by examining firms that repatriated under the 
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one-year tax holiday for repatriations provided by the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.  The Act provides a unique opportunity to isolate the effects of a dramatic and 
temporary change in the U.S. tax liability associated with foreign earnings.  Therefore, in 
an event study I evaluate firms‟ lock-out behavior around the dramatic and temporary 
change in the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system (i.e., for one year the 
U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings is reduced by 85 percent).  
 Using a sample of hand-collected financial statement data, I find that firms that 
repatriated under the one-time tax holiday behaved in a manner consistent with the lock-
out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Based on the expectations from De 
Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) theoretical model, I predict that firms will change 
their lock-out behavior around the one-time tax holiday for repatriations provided by the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  To my knowledge this study is the first to evaluate 
the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system around a dramatic and temporary 
change in the U.S. tax liability associated with foreign earnings.  Because theory predicts 
that the U.S. international tax system causes a lock-out effect for foreign earnings, I 
predict firms will have retained foreign earnings and accumulated those earnings as cash 
prior to the one-time tax holiday.  Likewise, I also predict that during the tax holiday 
firms will return the stored cash to the U.S. specifically to take advantage of the tax 
savings.  Furthermore, I expect that in the year following the Act firms will immediately 
begin repeating their lock-out behavior. 
 As predicted, I find that firms repatriating under the Act accumulated foreign 
earnings and held these earnings as cash prior to the one-time tax holiday.  This evidence 
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is consistent with De Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) theoretical model which 
predicted that firms repatriating under the one-time tax holiday will have accumulated 
foreign earnings abroad as cash as a result of the lock-out effect of the U.S. international 
tax system.  Also, consistent with predictions, I find that the changes in the firms‟ U.S. 
repatriation tax rates and cash holdings are positively associated with the change in the 
level of foreign earnings retained abroad due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. 
international tax system in the year of the one-time tax holiday.  Furthermore, consistent 
with prior research (Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 2007), I find that firms 
repatriating under the tax holiday significantly increased their share repurchases.  
Finally, consistent with expectations I find that the change in the U.S. repatriation tax 
rates were positively associated with the change in permanently reinvested earnings in 
the year following the tax holiday suggesting that firms immediately began deferring the 
repatriation of their foreign earnings due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international 
tax system.  Contrary to expectations, I find no significant association between the 
change in permanently reinvested foreign earnings and the change in cash holdings.  A 
potential explanation for this result is that cash holdings are measured as total cash 
holdings.  Total cash holdings include both foreign and domestic cash holdings of the 
U.S. parent corporation.  I expect that even if cash holdings increase in the foreign 
subsidiary, the increases in cash holding abroad would have at least been partially offset 
by decreases in domestic cash holdings to fund share holder distributions.  Although not 
obtained in the year following the tax holiday, I expect that firms may have still 
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increased their cash holdings in foreign jurisdictions.  I plan to investigate this 
expectation in future research. 
 This study makes several contributions.  First, it provides empirical support for 
De Waegenaere and Sansing‟s (2006) theoretical model which predicts that firms will 
have accumulated foreign earnings abroad in cash before and after the one-time tax 
holiday due to the lock-out effect of the international tax system.  Second, it supplements 
the findings of prior research (Blouin and Krull 2006, Clemons and Kinney 2006) by 
suggesting that firms not only increased their share repurchases in the year of the tax 
holiday but also in the year following the one-time tax holiday provided by the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  Third, the findings of this study will be useful to 
regulators and policy makers in assessing the effectiveness of the one-time tax holiday 
for repatriations provided under the American Jobs Creations Act of 2004. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is composed of two essays evaluating the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was intended to 
stimulate the economy by expediting the repatriation of foreign earnings and requiring 
that those repatriations be invested in domestic operations.  The first essay investigates 
(1) who repatriated foreign earnings under the provisions of the Act, (2) why firms 
repatriated and (3) what the firms did with the repatriated funds.  The first essay 
identifies 364 firms that repatriated approximately $283 billion under the Act.  The only 
significant increase in expenditures for the repatriating firms was for stock repurchases, 
an expenditure specifically prohibited under the Act.  Firms appear to have repatriated 
foreign earnings to take advantage of the tax savings without achieving the Act‟s 
intended objective of increasing domestic investment.  Firms‟ failure to use the 
repatriated cash to increase domestic reinvestment appears to be associated with two 
circumstances: (1) the firms lacked domestic growth opportunities and (2) they could 
comply with the domestic investment requirements of AJCA without actually increasing 
investments in domestic operations.   
 The second essay builds on recent research that evaluates the lock-out effect of 
the U.S. international tax system.  The second essay studies the factors associated with 
the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  Recent evidence suggests that 
firms that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations will 
accumulate foreign earnings abroad in financial assets to avoid recording the associated 
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U.S. tax liability.  However, prior research has not disentangled the difference between 
firms that permanently reinvest their foreign earnings for reinvest into operations versus 
firms that classify their foreign earnings as permanently reinvest to indefinitely defer the 
recognition of the associated U.S. tax liability.  The one-time tax holiday for 
repatriations provided the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provides an interesting 
opportunity in which to evaluate the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system.  
Using a hand-collected sample of firms that repatriated under the one-time tax holiday, I 
find that the firms were classifying their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested to 
avoid recognizing the associated U.S. liability before and after the one-time tax holiday.  
Also, during the tax holiday firms brought back significant amounts of cash previously 
classified as permanently reinvested foreign earnings suggesting that the earnings were 
not retained abroad for foreign reinvestment.  The results of essay two are consistent 
with theoretical predictions that firms repatriating under the Act classified their foreign 
earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. tax liability.  
Collectively, my results from essay two suggest that firms held significant amounts of 
foreign earnings abroad in cash due to the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax 
system and repeated the behavior immediately following the one-year tax holiday 
provided by the Act.       
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